

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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President : The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.

Contents.

	PAGE
Sir John Macdonell and the Study of Civics - - -	65
The Sociological Schools of Comte and Leplay. S. H. Swinny	68
On the Development of Sociology in Relation to the Theory of Progress. Christopher Dawson - -	75
Medical Theory and the Zeitgeist. Dr. Brock - -	84
The Social Evil. B. Stolberg - - - -	97
Geography and Civics. A. Farquharson - - -	104
Proceedings of the Society - - - - -	100
Letter to the Editor. G. R. Enock - - - - -	108
Reviews - - - - -	109
Forthcoming Meetings - - - - -	119
Notes and News - - - - -	120
Books Received - - - - -	122

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APRIL, 1921.

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Alike as a tribute to the memory of Sir John Macdonell, and as a reminder of scientific truths apt to be forgotten or overlooked, it is worth recalling something of the Society's original plan of action and scheme of correlated studies for the advancement of *Civics* and *Eugenics*. In the preface to the volume of Proceedings which included Galton's first paper on *Eugenics* published cheek by jowl with that paper on *Civics* by Geddes which specially appealed to Sir John Macdonell, the following pronouncement was made: "The one (paper) deals with the citizen and the other with cities. But problems of Population and problems of Housing only need to be stated in the more general terms of Organism and Environment for their interdependence to become manifest." This need to treat *Eugenics* and *Civics* as twin studies in which each would supplement and correct the tendencies of the other to abstractness and consequent aberration, continued to guide the Society's practice in regard to further papers by Galton and other

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writers on Eugenics, for these were published simultaneously with analogous papers on Civics. And this double harnessing went on as long as the care of Eugenics remained a direct commitment of the Sociological Society. It was only after the Eugenics Education Society, which began as a Committee of the Sociological Society, hived off on an independent career, that a certain excess of emphasis began to discredit Eugenics in the public mind.

Sir John Macdonell went further than merely accepting and supporting that necessary correlation of Civics and Eugenics, as a member of Council. In his capacity of publicist he procured for it exposition and re-inforcement with the prestige of a full-length leading article in the *Times*. That notable pronouncement, cited to-day after an interval of more than half a generation, speaks with an added insistence due to the aggravated neglect of city problems during the war. Here is the gist of what Sir John Macdonell then said through the medium of a *Times* leader :—

This is the age of cities, and all the world is city-building. Almost everywhere is a flow from the country toward. China and India may be still, in the main, lands of villages. But the West, Russia perhaps excepted, is more and more peopled by dwellers in cities. In a dim sort of way many persons understand that the time has come when art and skill and foresight should control what so far has been left to chance to work out; that there should be a more orderly conception of civic action; that there is a real art of city-making, and that it behoves this generation to master and practise it. Professor Geddes truly said (in his paper to the Sociological Society) the land is already full of preparation as to this matter; the beginnings of a concrete art of city-making are visible at various points. But our city rulers are often among the blindest to these considerations; and nowhere probably is to be seen a municipality fully and consistently alive to its duties in this respect. London may be left out of the question. Still a province rather than a city in the strict sense, wanting what, in the view of the early master of political science, was an essential of the true city, that it could "easily be overseen," with a vast floating population, it will be some time before it can be dealt with as an organic whole. But the rulers of such communities as Manchester and Newcastle and York ought long ago to have realised, much more than has been done, that they are not so much brick and mortar, so much rateable area, so many thousands of people fortuitously brought together. They have all a regional environment of their own which determined their origin and growth. They have all a rich past, the monuments of which, generally to be found in abundance by careful, reverent inquirers, ought to be preserved; a past which ought to be known more or less to all the dwellers therein, and the knowledge of which will make the present more interesting. Even when old buildings have disappeared, ancient roads, pathways, and streets can be traced; place names keep alive much history; and the natural features reveal to the practised eye what must have been the look and condition of a town in past ages. Professor Geddes gives a sketch of what he conceives the vast and ever-growing literature of cities will one day be. Even if the comprehensive monographs which he foreshadows are never written, it is not surely fanciful to expect that, with education universal, almost every dweller in our old towns will acquire some

degree of the feeling with which a member of an ancient family looks upon its ancestral house or lands—will, even without much reading, have some sort of notion of his predecessors and a certain pride in his membership of an ancient community. If he has not the good fortune to be a De Vere, a De Bohun, a Howard, Mowbray or Cavendish, he may perhaps be a citizen of a town which flourished when some of these families were unknown.

Such pride, or, as a lecturer preferred to term it, such "growth of civic consciousness and conscience, the awakening of citizenship towards civic renaissance," will be the best security for a worthy city of the future.

Professor Geddes glanced at the opening civic future, "the remoter and higher issues which a city's indefinitely long life and correspondingly needed foresight and statesmanship involve," the possibilities which may be early realised if only there be true civic pride, foresight, and unflagging pursuit of a reasonable ideal. It remains to be seen what our cities will become when for some generations the same spirit of pride and reverence shown by old families as to their possessions has presided over all civic changes and developments. Ruskin somewhere points out the mediæval love of cities, unwholesome, dirty, and forbidding though they were. He did not teach his generation that that affection might with more reason attach to the modern city if its people knew what it had been and steadily strove to make it better, if there was in every large community patriotism and a polity.

To its memorial account of Sir John Macdonell's life and work, the *Times* appended the following citation from Francis Bacon, as peculiarly applicable to a career of prolonged and richly varied public service, for the most part performed without publicity: "But above all, believe it, the sweetest canticle is *Nunc dimittis*; when a man hath obtained worthy ends and expectations. Death hath this also, that it openeth the gate to good fame." Many instances were recorded in the *Times* biography towards substantiating the application of Bacon's saying to Sir John Macdonell's career. The aid and service he rendered to the Sociological Society add one more instance to the narrative, for never did it occur to him to seek any sort of acknowledgment or publicity; and now for the first time are such aid and services made known beyond the circle of the Society's Council.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOLS OF COMTE AND LEPLAY.¹

MAN is subject to natural laws, cosmic, biological, psychological, and these affect him not only as an individual, but in his social organization; and if these laws had been different, he would have developed a different form of society. We may not agree with Milton that the obliquity of the ecliptic is a punishment for Man's first transgression,

" Else had the spring
Perpetual smiled on earth with verdant flowers,
Equal in days and nights,"

and yet we must recognize how greatly the change of the seasons has affected for good or ill Man's social evolution. Saint Simon thought that, as gravitation was the most general law known, all science, including social science, should be deduced therefrom. Spencer hoped that the main outlines of sociology could be deduced from the Law of the Survival of the Fittest, to which all organisms, including the social organism, must submit. But such deductions, even where they are possible, can take us a very short way in so complex a subject. Life is the interaction of organism and environment. For the social man and for society itself, this environment is social as well as cosmic and biological.

In fact, the influences that have produced the actual, social development of Man may be classed under three heads :—

- (a) the general laws, cosmic or biological, to which reference has already been made. These give the conditions of social evolution, but do not enable us to trace its course.
- (b) The immediate geographical environment, which differs at different points of the Earth's surface. This is the influence of *Place*.
- (c) The historic position, the influence of *Time*. In different stages of development, there will be different institutions. Each generation will inherit different, though it may be only slightly different, traditions, and these will affect its thought and its action. Thus in the modern world, we may trace the filiation of scientific discovery, which in turn reacts on industry and practical life.

1. An Address delivered before the Social Psychology group of the Sociological Society.

The first of these influences, the effect of cosmic, biological, psychological laws, on social life, has been studied by many writers, by Comte, who considered them the necessary basis of sociology, but despaired of deducing social laws therefrom, and still more by Spencer, who did not shrink from that task.¹ Comte dealt specially with the third influence, that of time, and above all with the transition of the last two thousand five hundred years from Theocracy to Modern Science. The second, or mean term, was, as so often happens, only successfully dealt with after the extremes had been studied. Montesquieu had sought to find the direct influence of climate, of heat and cold, of hardship and fertility, only to reach results at once vague and contradictory. But the problem that had baffled Montesquieu was solved by Leplay, who showed that the terrestrial environment did not act directly, but indirectly, through the kind of industry which it imposed, and that the form of the Family and the institutions springing therefrom, depended on the industrial organization. It is interesting to notice that at this very time, the middle of the last century, Darwin was solving the difficult problem of the transformation of species by showing that the main factor was not the direct action of the environment, but its indirect action in enabling suitable variations to survive and propagate.

Of Spencer I shall not speak further. In his lifetime he was more honoured than any other sociologist, but he has not shown so great a power of survival as his two chief contemporaries in the same field. These, Auguste Comte and Frederic Leplay, are in sociology complementary rather than antagonistic. Their lives ran almost parallel. They were both born in the period of disillusion that resulted from the failure of the Revolution to fulfil its promise, Comte in 1798, Leplay in 1806. They belonged to the same country, France, and to exactly the same class, their fathers

1. Comte has been declared unfit for this investigation because of his supposed ignorant disdain of Psychology. His critics appear to be unaware that in his time the term was used, not to embrace all studies of mental phenomena, but for the theories of a particular school. When Comte equally disowned the rival schools of Psychologists and Ideologists (Spiritualists and materialists), he took up just the same neutral position as to the relations of mind and brain occupied to-day by such exponents of the New Psychology as A. G. Tansley. So, too, when Comte protested against the *method* of introspection, he, like Tansley, objected to introspection without objective control and verification as the sole method of the science. Though it was impossible for Comte a hundred years ago to recognize the importance of the sub-conscious, it is noteworthy that on many points he approached the position of the new psychologists, in opposition to the then prevailing views, as *e.g.* in holding that innate instincts determine activities, that actions are not determined solely by the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, that the energies of the primitive instincts should be diverted rather than repressed, etc.

holding minor provincial posts in the Revenue Service, one in Languedoc, the other in Normandy. They were both at the Polytechnic, though neither completed his course there, the elder being expelled with all the students of his year, and the younger seeking the more congenial atmosphere of the school of mines. Both held teaching posts under the Government, Comte in mathematics, Leplay as Professor of Metallurgy. Both had in youth some contact with the Saint-Simonians. And both founded schools of sociology. But there were also considerable differences. Leplay was a great traveller, while Comte, though as an examiner for the Polytechnic, he had to traverse one or other half of France every year, never left his native country. Comte, when twenty-four, sketched the lines of his sociological career: Leplay issued his first great sociological work, *Les Ouvriers Europeens*, in 1855, when he was nearly fifty; and while Comte died in 1857, Leplay survived till 1882. But there were more important contrasts between them. Comte's aim was social progress and Leplay's social peace. The one was a Humanist in religion, who yet honoured and defended the Church and civilization of the Middle Ages; the other was a Catholic who especially admired certain Protestant countries. Comte was a republican, an ardent champion of the workers, but rather, perhaps, the revolutionary workers of the towns; Leplay was a conservative, a Senator under the Empire, yet with a deep sympathy for the people, especially the silent masses. The one was the man of towered cities with their great traditions of civilization, the other of the countryside with its simple pieties.

Yet in spite of these contrasts there was general agreement in their sociological method. It is true that Leplay introduced a new facility in the Survey, very useful for its purpose, but an instrument rather than a method. At bottom they were both essentially inductive. Comte's chief method was that of historic filiation. By induction, a generalization on the course of social development is formed from a study of historical facts, and this is controlled by a comparison with the course the development might have been expected to take, given the constitution of human nature and the particular environment in which it is acting. Unless the two lines of study give a coincident result, further investigation is necessary. The designation of this method by John Stuart Mill—not by Comte—as “inverse deduction,” has made careless readers believe that Comte's method was deductive. It was really inductive—induction with a strong control made necessary by the complex nature of the subject, a complexity which gives many opportunities for error. It was, perhaps owing to his trust in simple induction and to the absence of any such control that Buckle, in spite of his remarkable powers of generalization, so often went

astray. Leplay's method, like Comte's, is also inductive with a control, but in his simpler geographical approach, the control is also simpler. It consists in starting with some known or observed social state. For instance, we compare the pastoral family and its conditions as it actually exists to-day with the pastoral family as we should expect it to result from these conditions.

It must not be supposed that Comte failed to take account of geography. By geographical conditions, (the difficulties imposed to a career of conquest and the consequent diversion of free military energies to other activities,) he explained the peculiar path followed by Greek civilization. He also showed that Rome was geographically the natural centre of a Mediterranean empire. But Leplay went much further when he arrived at the general conception summarised in "place, work, folk," the geographical environment imposing the kind of industry on which the social organization and especially the form of the family depend. This was, perhaps, one of the most original discoveries in the history of science; the result of this discovery was to open up a new line of enquiry in sociology, not opposed to the historical method, but dealing with society from a different point of view. Long before Leplay, Montesquieu, and Comte in his appreciation of Montesquieu, had pointed out that it was in the earlier stages of man's development that the environment was of the greatest importance. It does not fail to exercise some influence in later stages also, both in the characteristics imprinted on institutions and on men, and in the immediate power it still exercises in the direction of industrial development. But in these later stages it is met by another influence, gradually increasing in potency, that of the social heritage, the ever-growing accumulation due to the thought and activity of man. The fundamental divergence of the two great sociologists is that one deals especially with the factor most powerful in early development, the other with that most powerful in the later. Thus both are needed for a complete study of social science, but for the *modern world* the historic method is more important. It may be added that to both Comte and Leplay sociology is the study of developments, not of origins.

All Comte's voluminous works on Sociology have been translated into English, save the *Philosophie Positive*, and of that a summary has appeared in our language. Not a single work of Leplay has appeared in an English form. On the other hand Leplay's sociological school has been the more prolific. It is easy to find the reasons for these differences. Comte's method may be likened to a battle-axe, which few but he could wield. Leplay's lighter weapon could be used with great effect by many besides the master. Moreover, owing to the wide range of Comte's

interests, which were religious, philosophical, and political, as much as sociological, his most distinguished followers, *e.g.*, M. Pierre Laffitte in France and Dr. J. H. Bridges in England, only gave a part of their attention to social science. On the other hand, while Comte, who had a rich and vivid imagination, may sometimes appear extravagant, he is rarely dull. This cannot be said of Leplay, who, cautious and well-balanced, yet outside the strict limits of social science, and especially in his smaller works, inflicts pages of platitudes on his readers. For translation it was, perhaps, wise to choose in preference the work of Leplay's brilliant disciple, M. de Tourville. This has appeared in English, under the title "The Growth of Modern Nations." It is to be hoped that a still more important work, "Comment la route crée le type social," by M. Edmond Demolins, may soon be translated.

Comte's classification of social forces into spiritual and temporal, the former being represented in a further sub-division by intellectuals and emotionals, and the latter by chiefs and people, has of late years been largely accepted. Indeed, in one aspect, history may be considered as the differentiation and interaction of these forces. But more particularly Comte conceived history as especially concerned with the transition from the early theocratic empires, as Egypt and Assyria, to the world of modern science and industry. Accepting Vico's "ideal history," the artifice of following the main stream of progress through the successive peoples that had in turn formed the vanguard of Humanity, Greece, and then Rome, and then the Catholic-Feudal world of the West in the Middle Ages, Comte dealt with the particular additions each made to the general heritage, and with the causes to which each owed its rise and its decline. His great powers of historic generalization can be seen even in the early essay, published when he was only twenty-two, wherein he traces the causes that led France to tend towards a centralized monarchy and England towards parliamentary forms and aristocratic predominance. More vital is his classification of the sciences and the history of their growth in the modern world. Once they had reached a certain development, the advance in each generation depended primarily on the position reached in the preceding period. That gave the growing point from which the next advanced. Thus, to take an instance, How explain the difference in the results of Galileo's discoveries in mechanics and Harvey's proof of the circulation of the blood? The one was followed immediately and continuously by the building up of physical science. The next great problems of physiology had to remain unsolved for more than a century. Harvey's discovery was by comparison barren, because further advance in the study of the living organism (*e.g.*, the changes undergone

by the blood in the lungs) had to await the development of chemistry. Of no less importance is his explanation of modern industry as the result of the previous development of modern science. The physical investigations of the seventeenth century were not carried on for the purpose of applying steam to industry, but they made such an application in the eighteenth century possible and sooner or later inevitable. Here the heritage becomes the predominant influence and the geographical environment only accessory. Mechanical and physical discoveries applied to industry produce the industrial revolution, and the changes in the organization of the textile industries, while the geographical environment makes Lancashire the centre of the cotton manufacture. In strict accordance with the thesis of Leplay, the new industrial organization profoundly affects the family, but the industrial organization itself is not, as in earlier stages, immediately and solely the product of the place in which it is situated. It is still more the result of the whole intellectual development of the West.

Let us turn now to the work of Leplay, especially as developed by M. Demolins. Starting from the great central plateau of Asia, where the pastoral life receives its most characteristic development, as well as the corresponding form of the family, the patriarchal, M. Demolins shows how that occasional necessity of the steppe, the caravan, affords the first occasion for the development of a public power outside the family, in the person of the caravan leader, whence, as a further development Attila and Tamerlane and the leaders of the "barbarian" invasions that have from time to time swept east and west. The fortunes of the herdsmen, driven by over-population or bad seasons to leave their accustomed pasturage on the central steppes, the very different fates they experienced, afford a fascinating study. Let us as an example follow those that went northwards. At first, the pasturage found on one side of all the rivers flowing northwards into Siberia enabled the migrants still to maintain their pastoral life, but as the climate grew colder their cattle and their horses—necessary to the management of large herds—died off. Horses and cattle had to be replaced by reindeer. The hard conditions of life in the Arctic circles rendered the people more and more miserable. They could not return for they had no longer any horses, and they now had to break up into smaller and smaller bands, so that they had no longer the means or the force to overcome the resistance of the herdsmen left behind, and who would have resented their return to share the pasturage of the steppes they had left long before. One way of escape alone remained—the easy crossing by Behring's Straits into America. The main stream of those who crossed would naturally move south-

wards through the prairies. They had no longer cattle or horses; but they found on the prairies immense herds of bison. They became hunters; and as hunting depends on personal skill and youthful vigour, the patriarchal family, founded on the possession of herds by the family and ruled by the eldest male as its representative, gave place to the tribe of hunters.

When, however, the weakest of these hunters were pressed to move further on and forced into the forests of South America, a still further change in the social organization took place. On the prairies the game—the bison—gathered in great herds and the hunters had to keep together in large bodies. It was necessary still to maintain social union. In the forests, the hunting of single animals required no such union. The tribes became smaller and smaller; and as the game was scarcer, the hunting grounds were constantly in dispute. Perpetual war prevailed. The young, more successful than the old in hunting, had no inducement to remain at home. The family became completely broken up, and there resulted that form known to Leplay as "the Unstable Family."

The development of another form of the family, called by Leplay "the Particularist Family," widely spread in Northern Europe and the countries colonized therefrom, is traced by M. de Tourville. Immigrants of pastoral stock, but already forced into agriculture, and so possessing the patriarchal family in a modified form, made their way up to the Fiords of Norway. Here they settled in the small corners of land suitable for cultivation, eking out their living by fishing. Their boats were small; the bits of land they cultivated were small—too small to support many families or to be divided among the sons at the father's death. Therefore as each son set up a new household, he sought in the fiord a new corner in which to establish himself. Usually, one alone would remain to work with the father and inherit his birthplace. But contrary to what happens in the unstable family of the hunters, the family centre here remains; the tradition is not broken; only new centres are formed. Thus the peculiar conditions of the Fiord led to a new form of the family, the Particularist Family, which once established, endured with only secondary modifications, in those other parts of North-Western Europe which it entered with migrant populations, and that in spite of the great differences in the new environment.

S. H. SWINNY.

ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY IN RELATION TO THE THEORY OF PROGRESS.

As the modern world gradually lost touch with the organized Christianity which had been the governing spirit of European civilization in the past, it began to find a new inspiration for itself in the ideal of Progress. From the second quarter of the eighteenth century onwards through the nineteenth, faith in human progress became more and more the effective working "religion" of our civilization; a religion fundamentally the same under the more or less philosophic or scientific disguise of the Encyclopædists or of Herbert Spencer as in the Messianic rhapsodies of the *Légende des Siècles*.

It is true that, alongside of this religious current and intermingling confusedly with it, there has been a genuine attempt to study the laws of social change, and the positive development of civilizations, but this scientific theory of progress has naturally been slower in developing and less fertile in results than its more emotional companion. The latter, which we may call the Gospel of Progress to distinguish it from the scientific theory of social development, had the advantage of finding for its apostles a series of great men of letters. From the time of the Abbé St. Pierre and Voltaire down to that of Victor Hugo, it was the dominant inspiration of the great literary movements of the age, most of all in France, but to a considerable degree in Germany and England also. Nor is this surprising: for it was the culmination of a literary tradition; its roots lie deep in the Renaissance culture, and if the Gospel of Progress itself was not explicitly held by the men of the sixteenth century, that was because the Renaissance as a whole only came to complete fulfilment in the eighteenth century Enlightenment.

The dominant characteristic of the culture of the eighteenth century, and one that it had received as a direct heritage from the earlier Renaissance, was a conception of Civilization as something absolute and unique—a complete whole standing out in symmetrical perfection, like a temple by Poussin or Claude, against a background of Gothic confusion and Oriental barbarism.

It was the old dualism of Hellenism and barbarism rendered abstract by generations of Renaissance culture; but whereas the sixteenth century scholar still looked back to the classical past as to a golden age, the eighteenth century philosopher had ceased to

despise the present. He looked forward to the immediate advent of a civilization which should be no less "polite" (urbane) than that of Greece or Rome, while it would be far richer in knowledge and in material resources. This ideal was well suited to the temper of the age, but it tended to diverge from and even stand in antagonism to the dispositions of a scientific sociology. It introduced a cleavage between the facts of social development and the ideals of the cultured world. The same spirit that Molière expressed regarding mediæval art

*"Le fade goût des monuments gothiques
Ces monstres odieux des siècles ignorants"*

was shown towards all the social institutions of the immediate past, and the offspring of the historic life of Europe was mercilessly hacked about on the Procrustean bed of eighteenth century reason and "good sense." When Condorcet sets himself to write a complete history of the progress of humanity, he condemns almost every institution which the societies of the past had evolved, and attaches supreme importance to the progress of intellectual enlightenment in the mind of the individual. As pure taste could create the perfect work of art, so pure reason would construct a perfect society. The history of the past was little more than a dismal catalogue of absurdities and crimes against humanity, all of which would have been avoided if man had been content to follow his innate good sense. When once he had learned that simple lesson, an Apocalypse of Reason would usher in the true Millennium.

This absolutism of method was as characteristic of the nature-worship of Rousseau, as it was of the rationalism of the champions of progress, and both these currents united in the French Revolution in an attempt to make a clean sweep of the past and to construct a perfect society on the foundations of pure doctrine.

In spite of the failure of these hopes and the powerful reaction that the experiment aroused: in spite of the work of Burke and de Maistre and the German thinkers of the period of national awakening, the temper of the eighteenth century enlightenment did nevertheless survive into the nineteenth century, and provided the main doctrinal foundation for the creed of Liberalism. The scientific temper of the new age could not, however, rest very contented with the purely abstract conception of progress which had satisfied the eighteenth century. The need was felt for a scientific law of progress which should be deducible from the observation of material phenomena, and numerous attempts were made to discuss the external forces which were responsible for social change. Hence the characteristic nineteenth century

Theories of Progress elaborated by Buckle in 1856, by Karl Marx in 1867, and by Herbert Spencer between 1851 and 1876. It was the latter who brought the idea of social progress systematically into relation with a general theory of evolution (that of Lamarck rather than Darwin), and treated it as the culminating branch of a universal development, physical, organic, social. But all these theories, we now see, were biassed by a certain "materialism," that is to say a more or less one-sided externalism in their attitude to history; hence their failure to attain a truly vital conception of society. It is true that Spencer insists at length on the idea of society as an organism, yet his prevailing externalism and individualism is seen in that he had no difficulty in reconciling the idea with his mechanical, utilitarian and individualistic views of the State.

To Buckle and Spencer civilization was primarily a state of material well-being such as they saw around them in the successful members of the community; and the greater spiritual currents that historically have moulded the higher civilizations were either neglected by them, or else were treated as forces which more or less retarded and distorted the normal development of society. Thus they regarded the civilization of their own age and country not as the result of the psychical development of a single, highly peculiar period, but as an absolute thing which was susceptible of improvement, but yet was in the main lines final and immutable. More than half a century before Spencer wrote, Herder (doubtless not a little influenced by Montesquieu) had given a far deeper and richer analysis of the movement of social development. He had shown "that the happiness of man is in all places an Individual good; that it is everywhere climatic and organic, the offspring of tradition and custom,"¹ but his thought was unsystematic and confused. Like Vico, he founded no school, and he stands by himself as the inspired precursor rather than the creator of a true theory of social evolution.

It was in fact during the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century in France that the foundations of a genuinely sociological science were laid for the first time. The post-revolution period was a time of intense intellectual activity. Social thought had been stimulated not only by the catastrophes of the Revolution itself but also by the new movement which had re-discussed the Middle Ages and shaken the complacency of the eighteenth century attitude towards the past. Moreover, new foreign influences—Lessing and Herder, Fichte and Hegel, and even the long unrecognized Vico—were being felt for the first time.

1. Herder's *Ideas towards the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*. Bk. viii, ch. 5.

Thus it was that men like St. Simon and Comte while retaining all the eighteenth century enthusiasm for Humanity and Progress, were able at the same time to combine with it a sense of the past at once realistic and appreciative and a recognition of the relativity of contemporary civilization, as one phase in the secular evolution of humanity.

The whole philosophy of Comte hinges on a Theory of Progress, but it was no longer Progress conceived in the external eighteenth century fashion. He had made the discovery that all social development is the expression of a spiritual *consensus* and it is this which creates the vital unity of society. Consequently the emphasis of Progress is neither on an improvement in material well-being as the Abbé St. Pierre believed nor an increase in the freedom and enlightenment of the individual such as Condorcet had traced in his *Tableau Historique*; the accent now is on the formation and growth of a living community which embraces every aspect of human life and thought, and in which every age has a living and internal connection with the past and the future. In other words, in order to construct a genuine sociology, the study of social institutions must go hand in hand with the study of the intellectual and spiritual forces which give unity to the particular age and society in question.

Unfortunately, in his own attempt to give scientific form to a general theory of Progress, Comte failed to free himself altogether from the vices of the older method. His survey of the whole field of social phenomena was made in the light of a brilliant generalisation based on the history of Europe, and indeed of Western Europe, alone, which is after all but one term of the social development of the human race. But though his actual interpretation of history was, as it were, pre-sociological, he had at least defined the true nature of social science, and had shown what were the tasks that it had to accomplish in the coming age. An adequate analysis of social life was only possible when the way had been prepared by the progress of the new sciences of anthropology, social geography and social economics, in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Frederic Leplay, the man who, more than any other, first brought social science into touch with the concrete bases of human life, was a striking contrast to the earlier sociologists or rather social philosophers. He was not concerned with theories of progress, and he had no general philosophy to serve. He was at once a man of faith, and a man of facts, a traditionalist, who loved his Europe, and desired to bring it back to the ancient foundations of its prosperity. In his patriarchalism, he came closer to Confucius and the classical teachers of China than to any modern Western thinker.

His method is well expressed in that saying of Fontenelle's which he chose as the motto of his great work: "He enquired with care into the value of soils, and their yield, into the aptitude of the peasants, their common fare and their daily earnings—details which, though they appear contemptible and abject, nevertheless belong to the great art of government."

It was by these enquiries, by the observation of the simplest forms of life in their natural economic relations, that Leplay and his school arrived at a clear conception of the natural region, as the mother and nurse of every primary social type. And this discovery was of capital importance for the future development of sociology since it supplied that concrete basis, the lack of which had vitiated all earlier social thinking. Without a true grasp of regional life and regional individuality, history becomes a literary exercise and sociology a theorising in the void. For we have to study not Man in the abstract, nor "the Aryan race," nor even the national type, but men in their fundamental local relations to the earth and the life of Nature.

This does not, of course, mean that social science must envisage man as the passive product of geographical and economic factors. Leplay himself would have been the first to deny it. Social progress and the very existence of society itself are the results of the creative force of human personality. The vital principle of society is spiritual, and the causes of progress must be sought, as Comte sought them, in man's psychical development rather than in the play of external circumstance. True social science must synthesize not only social geography and economics but also social psychology and ethics.

Nor can we limit ourselves to studying the psychology and ethics of the regional society alone.¹ That is only adequate in the case of the Nature Peoples; as soon as the beginnings of culture are reached it is necessary to consider not only the relation of the regional society to its environment, but also the actions and reactions that take place between the regional society and the individualities of the wider social units—the nation and the civilization.

It is, of course, highly necessary to give a regional interpretation to the history of even the most advanced peoples, if it is to be properly understood. For example the change which transformed the Spain of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries into the Spain of the sixteenth century is much more than a political change from

1. It will be noted that the writer uses *Regional* as more or less equivalent to *Rustic*. In the later developments of the Leplay method the *Region* includes the *City* as well as its adjacent countryside, and the development of each type of civilization is taken initially as a product of city life interacting with rustic life.—*Edr. Soc. Rev.*

separatism to absolutism, it is above all the transformation of a culture which was based on the regional life of the Guadalquivir valley and the Valencian coast, into one based on the Castilian plateau and the Galician and Biscayan coasts. In each age both these elements were present, but the one dominated, and gave its character to the Spain of the early middle ages, the other to the Spain of the sixteenth century.

Nevertheless this interpretation of Spanish civilization is not exhaustive. If we take two typical artistic products of the two regions, such as the Great Mosque at Cordova and the Cathedral of Burgos, we find that while each of them could only have been produced in that particular region, yet neither of them is explicable from the life of the region itself. They are both of them local variants of world types. Behind one stands the world movement of mediæval Christendom, behind the other the faith and culture of Islam.

Or take the case of the local men of genius. In Averroes of Cordova we see the final flowering of an intellectual movement which goes back to Avicenna of Bokhara and to the Syriac scholars of Mesopotamia, while his Castilian contemporary, St. Dominic, worked side by side with Italians and Frenchmen and Germans in a common task of spiritual reconstruction which affected all Western and Central Europe. Here again then we have spiritual world forces expressing themselves in local forms, and what is true of the works of art and the men of genius is equally true of the societies which gave them birth.

This brings us near to the famous generalization of Ibn Khaldun, the historian of the Berbers, according to which the Tribe which is the product of the region, and the Religion, which is a world force, are the two main factors in history. Under the breath of a common religious inspiration the tribes are bound together into a civilization, and when the inspiration passes the tribes fall back into their natural separatism. They live on, but the civilization dies.

Civilization is essentially the co-operation of regional societies under a common spiritual influence. This influence need not be religious in the ordinary sense of the word, for the Hellenic world and the civilization of modern Western Europe, as well as Islam and mediæval Christendom, form genuine spiritual unities.

But on the other hand a true civilization is much more than a mere piecing together of the different cultural elements supplied by different regions. It has an individuality of its own, which is capable of moulding, as well as being moulded by, the life of its component parts.

In the case of primitive civilizations, like that of Egypt, the

expression of this individuality takes a symbolic religious form which it is difficult for the modern mind to comprehend; but as soon as these closed local civilizations had been brought into close contact with one another, and had begun to be united into mere composite cultural wholes, we find behind every such unity a common view of life and a common conception of human destiny which give psychological unity to the whole social complex.

Behind every civilization there is a vision—a vision which may be the result of the joint labour of many minds, but which sometimes springs from the sudden flash of inspiration of a great prophet or philosopher. The faith in Progress and in human perfectibility which inspired the thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, was essentially of this order, just as much as was that great vision of the vanity of human achievement which Mohammed saw in the cave of Mount Hira and which made civilization and all temporal concerns as meaningless as “the beat of a gnat’s wing,” in comparison with the splendour of Eternal Power, burning alone like the sun over the desert. Nor can we doubt that the material progress of modern Europe as opposed to the material stagnation of Islam is, at least to some extent, the result of the different psychological effects produced by these two different visions.

Of course it may be argued with considerable truth that the inspiration of Mohammed was itself the product of his environment—of the desert caravan routes and the close juxtaposition of civilization and emptiness which is characteristic of the life of the oasis, but we must also remember that, only a century or two after its appearance this vision had become the dominant spiritual power in Syria, Babylonia and Egypt, the three richest and most populous regions of the Middle East. For a vision to be so universal in its effects there must be also something universal in its causes, and we cannot suppose it to be a merely fortuitous product of local circumstance. It is a world phenomenon that, in spite of its individuality, is in some sense governed by general laws which are susceptible of scientific investigation.

This is one of the main tasks in front of the social sciences, for while, thanks to the school of Leplay and to the anthropologists, great progress has already been made in the study of the evolution of regional life, little has been done to study, in the method of Science, the problem of the formation of the higher social unities. Hitherto historical science has concerned itself not with the spiritual unities, *i.e.*, the Civilizations, but with the political unities, the State and the Empire, and these moreover it has sought to interpret in terms either of race or of politics instead of in terms of world culture or of regional life. If once we begin to consider

Race apart from Region and Civilization, it becomes a pernicious abstraction which falsifies the whole view of history. Witness the false generalizations of the mid-nineteenth century historians of England and Germany, and still more the curious race-mysticism of such writers as Houston Stewart Chamberlain. And even commoner and more dangerous than this is the political or imperialist misreading of history, which justifies whatever is successful and measures social values in terms of material power. This is the error that lies at the root of most of our current misconceptions of progress, by substituting a false idea of social unification for the true one. Unlike civilization which is a spiritual co-operation of regional societies, Imperialism is an external forced unification, which may injure or destroy the delicate organisms of local life. It can only be of real value to culture, if it acts as the servant of a cultural unity or a spiritual force, which is already existent, as the Roman Empire was the servant of Hellenism, the Byzantine of Christianity and the Chinese of Confucianism. During the last fifty years Imperialism, whether military or economic, has tended to predominate over the spiritual element in the European world-society. The economic organization of the world has far outstripped its spiritual unity, and the natural development of regional life has been repressed or forced away by a less vital, but mechanically stronger world-power. Thus it is that the great modern city instead of fulfilling the true vocation of the city, which is to be the meeting and the marriage of region and civilization, is neither regional nor cultural, but is merely the misshapen product of world industry and economic imperialism.

These forces are in fact part of a movement of degeneration as well as of growth, yet they have been hailed all over the world as the bringers of civilization and progress. True progress, however, does not consist in a quantitative advance in wealth and numbers, nor even in a qualitative advance in technology and the control of matter, though all these play their subsidiary parts in the movement. The essential fact of Progress is a process of integration, an increasingly close union between the spirit of the whole civilization and the personality of the local society. This evolution of a richer and fuller group-consciousness we can trace through the history of all the ages that are known to us. Partial lines of progress, continuous improvement in the arts for instance, are obscure and often impossible to trace, but this great movement of integration which has proceeded almost without a break from the dawn of civilization in the river valleys down to the present day is real and incontestable. Nor can we set aside as merely Utopian the idea that this process is likely to continue until humanity as a whole finds social expression—not necessarily in one State—but in

a common civilization and a common consciousness—a synthesis in which every region can bring its contribution to the whole, without losing its own soul under the pressure of the dead hand of world imperialism.

This progressive realization of the unity of mankind was indeed Comte's interpretation of the historical process, and in this at least he was not simply misled by an abstract theory. Where he failed was in his attempt to determine the exact form of this final unification, in his ambition to draw up a constitution for the human race, and to create the spirit that was to animate it. But the laws by which a further synthesis may be reached are not to be determined by abstract theory, they are discoverable only by the study of the formation and disintegration of similar syntheses in the past—unities such as Hellenism and Islam, or China and India, which were but partial syntheses, it is true, but were universal in their aim.

In the militant world-state of Islam, and in the pacific social culture of China, in the free communion of the Hellenic cities, and in the life of mediæval Christendom with its common spiritual unity and its infinite diversity of local and civic forms, we may find not only more instruction, but more inspiration for the future of our civilization than in all the Utopias that philosophers and poets have ever dreamed.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

MEDICAL THEORY AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE ZEITGEIST.

I.

IN ANTIQUITY.

PERHAPS it is not sufficiently realized that the present widespread epidemic of neurasthenia (or modified shell-shock) attacks the savants as well as the rank-and-file of humanity. Professors suffer from it as much as other people, and accordingly its symptoms appear in their philosophies. Our intellectual outlook is determined more than rationalists would care to admit by our moral condition. Indeed, philosophies are really waking dreams, and their thought-forms are to be explained largely on the principles of dream-interpretation.

I shall try to show how the prevailing spirit of the age, the *Zeitgeist*, tends ever to run parallel in social and medical theory. We may conveniently begin by some examples from ancient Greece.

GREECE.

Ancient Greece was not a "country" in the modern sense: "it" was a lot of little communities scattered about the eastern Mediterranean (in Greece "proper," Asia Minor, Southern Italy, Sicily, North Africa, &c.) and united by trade, by racial kinship, by a common language and civilization. When Greece was at her best, she was not a political unity at all; political centralization first followed the need for repelling the Persians; later, under Alexander, it signified nothing but the Greeks' loss of freedom.

During the "golden age" of Greece (fifth and particularly fourth centuries B.C.) the unit of community life was the city-state or *polis*. This was much less of an abstraction than our modern State; the *polis* was the actual locality in which the Greek resided, worked, and spent his daily life; the Greek was really practical, and concerned himself less than we do now with places in which he did *not* live. All citizens took part in the daily life of their town or district. The *polis*, in fact, had not yet become a *metropolis*. Thus one's thought and action were better harmonised with each other and also with those of other people. Science and Art were not divorced, and all co-operated together for the welfare of the community. The social harmony of an ancient Greek city-

state was more like what we find to-day in our remoter country districts, which civilization has hardly reached—only Greece added genuine Culture to this, without the balance being upset.

HIPPOCRATES.

No savant better shows the characteristic Greek moderation or "temperance" than the "Father of Medicine." He was the director of the Asclepieum or health-temple of Cos, a little island off the Carian coast, near Rhodes. These Asclepiea resembled our modern sanatoria to some extent, only the physician-superintendents combined priestly (or at least psycho-therapeutic) with their more strictly medical functions. Hippocrates stands essentially for the concrete ("clinical") approach to the study of medicine, for the synthetic as opposed to the analytic or specialistic. He was *par excellence* the observer. He was an Empiric in the best sense of the term—an Experientialist (not yet, however, to any extent an Experimenter). His knowledge was based on first-hand experience of the countless invalids who flocked to Cos.

The rival medical school was at Cnidos, on an adjacent promontory of the mainland. The Cnidians were the Germans of their day—painstaking, observant of detail, eschewing hasty generalization, and suspicious of "reasoning." Their weakness was that they often did not see the wood for the trees. Attentive to symptoms they missed diseases; too keen on diagnosis they undervalued prognosis (forecast) and so, except in surgery (with its relatively simple and clear-cut problems), they were weak in practice. Hippocrates observed no less carefully than the Cnidians, but he took care to observe first the sick patient, and he envisaged the course of his disease as a whole.

Hippocrates was greatly struck with the fact that most diseases get better of themselves (through what we call the *vis medicatrix naturæ*). He rendered homage to the natural powers of the living organism, of the "Nature" (*Physis*, *φύσις*). He saw that a living organism or organic part grows, maintains itself, and even resists disease, by its own powers. He particularly noticed its faculty of *specific selection*—of drawing from its environment what is appropriate for its life—with the corollary of rejecting what is useless ("crisis," "eccrisis"). He saw that much of what we call "disease" is merely a sign that the organism is having unusual difficulties in appropriating the necessary pabulum from its surroundings (in mastering its problems, learning its lesson). The heat and disturbance of fever or inflammation means that the battle is being waged—the "crisis" means that the organism has won, that it has "digested" its experience and that the superfluous "waste products" are now being thrown out.

It will be understood, therefore, that Hippocrates was inclined to allow the organism as far as possible to fight its own battles. He believed as we should now say, in "immunization," and especially when this was carried out by the organism itself; it would thus, he saw, be better able not merely to resist but to utilize further "attacks" of the same nature. Hippocrates advised the doctor only to interfere when the battle was obviously going against the patient.

He laid stress on particular "temperaments," each being ascribed to the excess of a special "humour"; this was the basis of his characteristic "humoral" theory.

To the Father of Medicine and his great successor Aristotle we very appropriately give territorial designations. We call one "the Coan" and the other "the Stagyrite." Both were very definitely part-and-parcel of their regional *milieux*, and both in their biological teaching emphasized the constant interdependence of Organism and Environment.

Hippocrates saw that in "disease" as in health all main conditions had to be taken into account—thus, in an illness, no mere microbe or toxin but the heredity, upbringing, previous diseases, mental reactions, as well as all the present circumstances—physical, social, economic, and the rest. He does, for instance, ample justice to the physical environment in his book, "On Airs, Waters and Places."

Further, Hippocrates strongly advocates *the comparative method* in studying the life-sciences. The more cases of a disease one sees, the better will one be able to understand and treat each new one, and our experience grows from this. But we must compare also our disease with diseases which are similar. Moreover we must see the same disease under different circumstances; in different regions it will take on different forms. "Travel," said the great Coan, "see cities in various situations, and you will learn the environmental conditions which affect disease and health."

We thus see that Hippocrates is the medical representative of that essential sanity, that balance, which characterized Greek culture at its best. The supremacy of his all-round outlook has at no time been seriously questioned, even when, as in our time, it has tended to be (subconsciously) neglected.

Why the competing Cnidian school was so exclusively analytic, so blind to the organism's unity and natural powers, so absorbed in symptoms, it is impossible to say. Cnidus was on the coast of Asia Minor, whereas Cos was an island. Can it be that the former town was more under the influence of the Asiatic despotisms (Carian, Lydian) of the hinterland, and that the mechanistic life-theory of its medical school reflected the servility of its politics?

DECLINE OF THE GREEK CITY-STATE.

The unity of Greek culture-life reached its apogee in Athens under Pericles. The break-up began with the Peloponnesian war, and was consummated by the Macedonian conquest. The concept of "City-plus-Citizen" now became replaced by that of "State" and "Individual," over-against one another, even pulling opposite ways. Thinkers differed as to which of these two was the more important—thus Socrates held by the individual, and developed an abstract "Morality" in place of Citizenship, while his pupil Plato proclaimed the supremacy of the State. The latter's Republic was entirely a product of its master's brain, not a development of any existing community; hence its failure in practice when applied in an absolute spirit to Syracuse by the reigning tyrant there. To the individualists the State was a more or less interfering factor, to be disregarded, eluded, or even, if need be, opposed, but never to be really utilized.

Medicine showed the same mechanical and metaphysical tendency. The teaching of Hippocrates degenerated into "Dogmatism" and "Rationalism." His followers ceased observing and reasoned *a priori* from the principles (dogmata) at which the Master had arrived from personal experience.

ARISTOTLE.

A magistral attempt was made by Aristotle to check this "dissociation," intellectual, moral, and social. To the high subjective idealism of his master Plato he added a biologist's appreciation of the environment. The pupil's concept of a Republic was based on first-hand knowledge of the little city-state of Stagyra, on the borders of Macedonia and Thrace, where he spent the first eighteen years of his life. Aristotle's was a comprehensive mind in biology and the social sciences, similar to that of Hippocrates in medicine. He crystallized the whole content of Greece's contributions to biological and social thought.

Then, as the Hellenic period closed and the Hellenistic began, those non-vital tendencies which, for example, in medicine, had shown themselves in the teaching of Cnidus and in post-Hippocratic Dogmatism and Rationalism, gained an ever-increasing ascendancy. Gone now were the free cities of Greece, and replaced by the semi-oriental monarchies of Alexander's successors (thus Macedon, Egypt, Syria, Pergamum). People felt that their intimate *polis* had become subordinated to a *metropolis* more or less distant. Not only was there internal conflict between Individual and State, but the different States themselves were strictly separate and competitive, even mutually hostile (on prin-

ciples fully worked out and approved by our Machiavellis, Treitschkies and Crambs in modern days).

Such fundamental social antagonisms necessarily showed themselves also within the psyche; each of the isolated "individuals" of these States himself lacked mental cohesion; in modern scientific parlance, he suffered from an "endopsychic conflict"—the very elements of his mind were out of harmony. This is exemplified in the fine-art of the period; thus, compare its typical sculpture, the *Laocoon* group or the *Battle of the Gods and Giants* with the serenity of Periclean art.

ALEXANDRIA.

The characteristic medical school of the time was that which arose at Alexandria under the Ptolemies, and the subject most studied was anatomy. Alexandria represents, so far, a healthy reaction against the orthodox Dogmatic teaching (I shall later touch upon a parallel revolt of the anatomists of Renaissance Italy against the Dogmatism of the Middle Ages), but it remained too much at the level of mere scepticism, analysis, and the observation of minutiae, and it failed to rise, like Hippocrates and Aristotle, to a vision of Life.

THE EMPIRICISTS.

Another realist school of Alexandria was that of the Empiricists, in opposition to Rationalistic apriorism. They rejected pathology, with its study of causes, and laid all stress upon what experience (*ἐμπειρία*) showed to be useful in disease.

"We are not concerned," they said, "with how one digests, but with what is digestible." This sounds well, but the danger of Empiricism is that it tends too much to pin its faith on quick results, on mere suppression of prominent symptoms.

The Empirics and Anatomists, though equally hostile to the degenerate Hippocratism of their day, had yet little use for each other. (Again this phenomenon is paralleled, in the seventeenth century, in the relations between Harvey and Sydenham; and similarly, in our own time, there is apt to be mutual distrust between the clinician and the laboratory worker).

ROME.

Ancient Rome as we know it was first a republic and then an empire. Note that this great type of imperial systems was the Empire of Rome, not of Italy. It was the development of a town, not of a country. (In the same way our recent enemy was much more the Empire of Berlin than of Germany.)

As the result of a long series of wars, growing increasingly more aggressive, the Roman Republic became corrupt; political power passed more and more into the hands of a caucus of war-profiteers who oppressed the people, and withheld the franchise from the Italians. Tribunes of the Plebs protested, beginning with the Gracchi. Anarchism increased. The only solution appeared to be the setting up of a "benevolent despotism." This was effected by Julius Cæsar, and his nephew Augustus established the Empire.

Rome got her culture (including her medical culture) entirely from Greece; the civilization usually called Roman is really Græco-Roman. It is highly important to realize that Greek science and literature came to Rome in its Hellenistic rather than its Hellenic form.

Social activity in the later years of the Republic degenerated into politics. For carrying this on sophists were required, and this need, again, was supplied by the nimble-witted Greeks; they opened Schools of Rhetoric in Rome, where the art of persuasion was taught for a fee. All was reckoned good that came from Greece, as in our pre-war universities all was good that came from Germany. (But as the Roman importation was not true Hellenic culture but Hellenistic, so we might say that the Kultur that we so recently worshipped was less German than "Germanistic"; in both cases, the well of knowledge had become fouled by imperialism; Life had been dethroned and replaced by the State.)

LUCRETIVS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY.

The increasing social anarchy which marked the last days of the Republic was paralleled by widespread mental and spiritual disorder. This is amply borne witness to by the work of the poet Lucretius, who, in his *De Rerum Natura*, comes boldly forth in a psychotherapeutic rôle. The old forms of the Roman religion had ceased to carry meaning. The old creed had degenerated into a religion of terror. Neurasthenia was rife. Men's hearts were failing them for fear; they were haunted by dread of eternal punishment. Lucretius' gospel had two sides, firstly critical, and secondly spiritual. The first, which was Epicurean and atomistic, demolished men's fears by showing that there was no substance behind them (it literally knocked the old religion into "atoms"). In striking phrase the poet demonstrates that the legends of Hades are purely symbolic—(thus Tantalus's "*saxum impendens*" is the dread of "something impending"; the vultures that devour Tityos are devouring passions, etc.). In short, Hell is here, in this life.

Lucretius gives vivid descriptions of nightmares and "war

dreams." His teaching is that men's *phobias* rest entirely on wrong thinking, on superstition (*religio*), and his method of treatment is essentially what would nowadays be called "thought-control."

But the harsh fatality of ancient Atomism is softened in Lucretius, firstly, by the theory of the "swerve" (declination) of the atoms, this symbolizes the fact that man has at least a modicum of free-will—that, if he cannot annul the force of external circumstance, he may *deflect* or even *direct* it. Secondly, the poet introduces a spiritual principle, which, in the opening invocation of the *De Rerum Natura*, he denominates "Venus," and to which he somewhat inconsequently subordinates even the warring atoms themselves. Venus alone, he says, can conquer Mars; that is, Love alone can conquer Strife. Elsewhere, this embodiment of Love becomes a creative evolutionary principle (*natura creatrix*), which we may identify, if we will, with the Reason and the Unknowable of Hegel and Herbert Spencer, and best of all, perhaps, with Bergson's *Evolution Créatrice*.¹

FASHIONABLE MEDICINE AT ROME.

While Lucretius, as psychotherapist, thus brought forward his democratic gospel of thought-control for all who were in sorrow and perplexity, there were also "fashionable" physicians who catered primarily for the ailments of the more fortunate few. The typical exponent of "scientific" (Hellenistic) medicine in Rome was Asclepiades, from Asia Minor, who arrived at the capital shortly after Lucretius' book had appeared; it is noteworthy that he established himself first as a teacher of rhetoric, and afterwards as a physician. His biological teaching, like Lucretius's psychology, was based upon the materialistic atomism of Epicurus, but, unlike the Latin poet, he tempered his doctrine with no trace of vitalism. As against the Humoral theory of orthodox Hippocratic medicine, Asclepiades taught an uncompromising "Solidism." According to Atomic philosophy, there is nothing in the universe but atoms and void. Asclepiades held the void in a living body to be disposed in the form of minute channels which, when unduly relaxed or constricted, through inharmonious movements of the atoms constituting their walls, gave rise to the two great types of disease.

As regards the "humours," Asclepiades maintained that these did not really occur as such in the body; thus the so-called "bile" which made its appearance after the taking of cholagogues was

1. Probably the modern Germanistic psycho-therapeutic school would consider this a mere "sublimation" of sexuality!

really an artificial product, from the breaking down of normal tissue by the drug!

Asclepiades held that the organism or living tissue had no powers of its own, no specific selecting-faculty, no *vis medicatrix naturæ*. Nature never cures, so everything depends on the doctor, who must interfere energetically in all cases. Formerly, he says, doctors like Hippocrates, under pretext "of leaving things to nature," had simply *looked on while their patients died*.

Asclepiades' theory of clashing atoms (with a kind of "survival of the fittest") was strictly in consonance with the social theories of the political strivers in these last days of the Republic. Cicero, himself a *novus homo* and typical opportunist, a stylist in literature, was Asclepiades's great friend. That neither had any organic or historic relationship with Rome will help to explain the "absolute-ness" of their respective theories, social and medical.

The atomic "harmony" at which Asclepiades aimed in treatment seems to have been at best a state of equilibrium between opposing forces. To promote this "harmony" he employed what would be called nowadays mechano-therapeutical methods—legitimate as far as they went, but inadequate (gymnastics, baths, massage, etc.). He also advocated the use of wine (alcohol is a good stimulant); he healed "safely, quickly and pleasantly," and apparently had a good bedside manner. He was *par excellence* the type of the successful West-End practitioner.

PROVIDENCE OR ATOMS.

The alternative of "Providence or Atoms" is thus represented in ancient medicine by Hippocrates and Asclepiades respectively. The latter gives little credit to that Nature or Physis which the former considers fundamental. Further, he who minimises the vital powers of the organism will have little belief in his own indwelling divinity. Those of the Asclepiadean school were what we would call Deists (like the eighteenth-century French intellectuals) believing in absent gods. This shelving of the Deity is well expressed by Lucretius in a passage which has been thus paraphrased by Lord Sherbrooke:—

"But the great Gods, of every good possess,
Enjoy eternal peace, eternal rest;
Far from the strife of men and man's domain,
They know no gratitude and feel no pain."

—*De Rer. Nat.*, II, 646—651.)

Everything, in fact, depends upon our circumstances; we cannot escape our destiny—we cannot pick and choose. The *swerve* of the atoms tends to mean at most that we have intellectual freedom,

that we may learn to "take our troubles philosophically." These Epicureans lived in a time when circumstances were indeed hard and complicated, but also they were lazy and did not try sufficiently to master circumstances.

METHODISM.

The mechanical spirit of the time demanded that all scientific teaching should be systematized—put into categories. Thus Asclepiades's doctrine developed into "Methodism" which claimed to find the common mean between orthodox post-Hippocratic Rationalism and the summary methods of the Empiricists. "Go by experience," it said, "but cut this down to the minimum requirements, and superadd a Method." All diseases were either those of (1) constriction of the "pores," (2) dilatation, or (3) both together. Treatment consisted in attacking the prominent symptom by its opposite (thus, constricted conditions by laxatives, etc.). In this way Roman bureaucracy acquired a scientific system of medical classification, with a clearly defined rule-of-thumb method of treatment. I shall show in a later paper how a similar tendency to Methodism, medical and social (and religious), appeared as a characteristic product of the eighteenth century, and also how it has shown itself again in our time; for example, in the "bacterial theory" of disease, in doctrinaire Socialism, etc.

THE EMPIRE AND VERGIL.

The Republic had stood for Rome's extension; the Empire stood for its consolidation. Augustus, a shrewdly practical man, saw that the internal conflicts would never stop until his subjects were given a religion. The old gods and other religious conceptions framed for vastly different and simpler conditions had little bearing upon the problems of metropolitan and imperial life. Augustus accepted the Religion of Rome, but identified the secular evolution of the great city with his own deified self. For the purpose of "propaganda," for "boosting the Empire," so to speak, he employed such writers as the poet Vergil and the historian Livy, the latter being the Mommsen or Seely of his day. At the head of this Ministry of Imperial Propaganda was Maecenas. Vergil, the gentle peasant poet from Cisalpine Gaul, was first commissioned to sing the praises of country life and labour. This was in connection with the Emperor's policy of ensuring peace by settling the discharged soldiers of the Republican wars on the land. Here was a congenial task for Vergil, and to it he did ample justice in the *Georgics*, undoubtedly his best poem. Happy, says Vergil, was Lucretius (his master in style and inspiration) who had communed with the immensities, and risen to a conception of the

World-Spirit which enabled him to cast fear and superstition below his feet. *But no less happy*, it must be added, *is he who knows the country gods.*

What is the poet's meaning here? What is it that in this latter passage he adds to the somewhat chilly pantheism and nirvana of Lucretius? Pan, Silvanus, and the rest, it seems to me, are not mere "nature gods"; they do not stand so much for the "forces of nature" as for the *relation* of man to those forces; they symbolize the very spirit of man's economic life, the action and reaction between him and his natural environment.¹

Following the *Georgics*, Vergil was urged to write an epic on the divine destinies of Rome. The result was the *Aeneid*, in which, in Hegelian wise, our bard attempts to identify the Roman State, conceived as a drama in time, with no less a principle than the Lucretian world-spirit itself. But, where Hegel succeeded, the more spontaneous Vergil failed. The rôle of Court poet did not really suit him, and he was soon disillusioned about the Empire, in which all the old faults of the Republic were quickly reappearing. Hence the joyousness of his earlier pastoral poems is replaced by the brooding sadness of the *Aeneid*. In what F. W. H. Myers calls the "central passage" of the latter poem we have complete abandonment of the imperialistic note, and a return to the pure Lucretian pantheism—to a pantheism that is, however, deprived of full actuality because unconnected with any theory of folk-lore.

Worldly preferment had taken away the peasant poet from his native fields, and he had lost the true secret of contact with the godhead, namely, through labour. For work he could at best substitute a dim concept of Purgatory. Hence his worship declined into somewhat of a dull unsatisfied longing (*Sehnsucht*).

Vergil's disillusionment with bombastic imperialism may well be compared with Wordsworth's experience in regard to the French Revolution. Both poets learned in the travail of their souls that political movements, however grandiose, can never be more than palliative medicine for social woes. Both fell back eventually, more or less, on the nature-worship of their childhood. The English poet who had at first acclaimed "Revolutionary Principles" as the medicine for liberating Humanity came to write:—

"Earth is sick
And Heaven is weary of the hollow words
Which States and Kingdoms utter when they talk
Of truth and justice."

1. I have further elaborated this interpretation of the figures of folk-lore in my book "Sanity and Health," shortly to appear in the *Making of the Future Series*.

And to him anon came peace :—

“ Peace had he found in huts where poor men lie,
His only teachers had been woods and rills,
The silence that is in the starry sky,
The sleep that is among the lonely hills.”

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

As men's circumstances steadily worsened under the Empire, the generality of people ceased to struggle, lost faith and hope, and relieved themselves by drugs, physical and moral. People with minds of finer calibre were “driven back on themselves,” and highly subjective religions continued to appear. Thus Stoicism accepted the “impossibility” of things, but (more even than Epicureanism) at least taught men to “stick it.” People felt themselves between the upper and the nether millstone, the State on the one hand and the growing forces of anarchy (our modern Bolshevism) on the other. These were both mechanical forces, hostile to individual freedom of action. Many of the intellectuals were themselves in the State service; their harsh mechanical duty was prescribed for them; at the very most by a system of intensive “thought-control” they might learn to maintain a certain integrity of soul. Their official and their private codes of morality were thus sharply separated (under similar circumstances various forms of “other-worldly” mysticism are plainly multiplying in our own day).

JUVENAL.

The satirist Juvenal writes in Domitian's reign, at the end of the first century of our era; if we compare his comments on Roman society with those of Horace, nearly one hundred years earlier, we shall realize that morals had steadily declined during this time.

Vice, he says, had reached its zenith. The great Roman people had become a crowd of hangers-on, maintained in idleness by doles, free meals, and public shows. The city was full of alien upstarts.

MARCUS AURELIUS.

In the second century the “Good Emperors” made a noble attempt to stay the dissolution, to check abuses and to restore honest and economic government throughout the Empire. But the structure had become top-heavy, and its fall could at most be postponed. At this age, when Hope seemed lost, Stoicism at least gave men courage to go on and do the day's duty till death should

bring relief. The religion of Marcus Aurelius is essentially one for the soldier, for him even who is fighting a losing battle. The Stoic Emperor's book was written on the Danube front, in the war against the invading Germans.

GALEN.

Thus we see the increasing social disintegration in the sequence Horace-Juvenal. Marcus Aurelius stands for the last organized attempt to "hold" it.

In medical thought there was a parallel movement. The analytic, critical method of Cnidus becomes "regularized" at Alexandria; something like a struggle for existence takes place between the different specialisms. Asclepiadean Methodism ultimately wins and secures more or less official standing. The doctors, with their specialistic view-points, lose sight of the unity of life.

Galen, consulting-physician to Marcus Aurelius, was the "Good Emperor" of medicine; he combated this disintegrative process by a huge synthetic effort. Just as Hippocrates and Aristotle had comprehensively grasped the whole content of Hellenic medical, biological and social science before the transition to the Hellenistic period, so now Galen with Græco-Roman leechcraft before the Empire fell. Hippocrates forms the base, Galen the apex of Greek medicine.

To the vitalistic tradition of the school of Cos Galen added the erudition and special research of Alexandria. This huge body of learning he combined with his own life's experience, digesting it, and reshaping the whole into a clear and harmonized presentment of the Medicine of Antiquity.

Galen bases himself upon the method of Hippocrates, the concrete, the clinical; he is Empiricist first, in the best sense. But with increasing experience comes a grasp of general principles, and thence an opportunity for deductive and analogical reasoning. Yet with short cuts to diagnosis as, characteristically, that of the Methodists, Galen will hold no parley; a disease, he says, is caused not by one factor but by many; these must all be considered in each sick patient and their relative importance judged before treatment with any claim to be scientific can be attempted. Above all, Galen is a vitalist, reverencing, like his master Hippocrates, the living powers of the organism; this is the "Nature," the *Vis Medicatrix*, the Physis; in more extended survey it is the very spirit of life, the *Anima Mundi* of Lucretius and Vergil, the Creative Evolution of modern vitalistic science.

And needless to say, Galen can only understand (and treat) the living organism in relation to its environment.

As I shall show in the next paper it was in the form of Galenism that Greek medicine dominated the Middle Ages. Like many another good creed it became, in time, hardened and formalized, and had, for a season at least, to be thrown aside. I shall try to show how much the spirit of Galenism is needed by modern "orthodox" medicine, which is once again fondly attempting to substitute analysis for synthesis, the specialist for the "general practitioner."

ARTHUR J. BROCK.

"THE SOCIAL EVIL."

AN APPROACH FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

STATISTICS indicate that successful campaigning against tuberculosis, typhoid fever and other plagues automatically heightens the death-rate of non-infectious diseases such as cancer. This, of course, is no indication that the fight is futile, for the infectious diseases are far more insufferable and degenerative, physically as well as morbidly, to the individual and to society alike. The ethical and educational implication of any such movement is not the elimination of disease and death as such, both of which are necessarily endemic. It is to teach people to live, to suffer and to die in the socially least disintegrative fashion.

Though analogies are most misleading in social science, this prognosis also holds true of prostitution. "With prostitution it is as with vice, crime and disease; the teacher of morals endeavours to prevent the vices, the law-giver to prevent the crimes, the physician to cure the diseases. All alike know that they will never truly attain their goal; but they pursue their work none the less in the conviction that he who does only a little good yet does a great service The profession of prostitution is an evil of all time, all countries, and appears to be innate in the social structure of mankind," wrote none less than Parent-Duchatelet in 1836.

Of course, the abolition of prostitution depends wholly upon our definition of it. In a way, academic sociologists do well to avoid many difficulties by narrowing a vast and complex problem into a definition sufficiently succinct and rigorous for the applied sociologist to treat as an accomplishable programme. Therein lies the pragmatic value of viewing society as a structure, organic if you please, subject to diagnosis and prescription. We may most helpfully define prostitution as mercenary, impassive, professional sex promiscuity. Then a programme of social legislation enforced by an honestly efficient police may effectively diminish its extent, at least sporadically and temporarily. But in a far more profound sense society is not an organism subject to legal therapy, but a mind subject to moral education. We all know that many a marriage is morally equivalent to a life of prostitution, less tolerable perhaps because its solution is complicated by the legal and equitable difficulties of divorce. Some of us also know that the existence of even the lowest harlot has its moral tints and interludes

of friendship, affection and genuine charity. And we are increasingly recognizing the fact that no matter what the historical justifications for the double standard of morals might be, in our own day of coeval, social and economic responsibility of the sexes, it surely is absurd to absolve of grave accessory guilt the male venereal carrier. In short, prostitution is one of the most relative problems in the very fluid field of social ethics. Anthony Comstock no doubt would have hauled into court Hero and Leander, and called Ninon de Lenclos a strumpet, while the younger Dumas put his finest character into a courtesan. Love and lust are never altogether separable and prostitution in its widest sense is coextensive with society. It is the diffusion through the whole social order of all those intersexual relations in which love and affection do not play the leading part.

I hold to this broad definition of prostitution because it seems to me that ultimately the scientific method in sociology is not delimitation, though I willingly acknowledge its practical value, but the most perspicacious search for all the social innervations and irradiations of the problem under study. It is impossible to understand either the history or etiology of prostitution if we confine its definition to the few customary essential characteristics. The specialized definition does not account for its traditional relation to matrimony, its religious background, its general place in the development of *mores* and of morals, and therefore it lacks the ethical insight essential to the amelioration of the problem. The *sine qua non* of any programme of sex hygiene is the culture of the sex needs of the entire community, and no amount of direct dealing with prostitution is efficiently and permanently helpful unless we always keep in the back of our minds that the social evil is enmeshed in all the ramifications and interstices of the Vast Society, and that its conglomeration in spots and accentuation in individuals finds its medical analogy in those diseases of the separate organs which are conditioned by the low vitality of the entire body. The ethical implication of this commonplace is a more human and humane attitude towards the prostitute in particular, and toward sexual missteps in general. The conviction that the prostitute is not a being congenitally apart, a "type," but is human along with our mothers and wives and daughters ought to be cultivated not merely because it is essentially true to life and therefore good sociology, but also because it is the only attitude which will enable us to lay aside that silly sense of moral superiority and social prudery, and above all things that pose of pity and under-educated sociality with which the conventionalized Philanthropy and Church impede so much of our progress.

The endemic character of prostitution rests upon the uncon-

trollable vigour of the sex instinct, which cannot possibly for the whole of society be brought within the organization of a code. Alcoholism, drug addiction, the sexual and other perversions are pathological accidents of evolution in that they are true physiological abnormalities. Because alcoholism is not based upon a fundamental instinct, it is not intrinsic to our social structure; and its prohibition, enforced long enough, may effectually eliminate it as a social evil. But a desire for sex experience is not only normal and wholesome; its instinct is fundamentally imperative. Its commercialization, then, is not symptomatic of a diseased instinct, but of the native inadequacy of codification alone to care for the love demands of our entire society. When the puritanical physician and minister preach that sex continence is not bad for one's health they are not only contributorily responsible for a good deal of sexual aberration and for the frequent direction of normal sex hunger into channels of self-abuse, but they miss the moral point as well, because man is not here to enjoy good health alone. We need our health as we need our daily meals for a more abundant life and not for the sake of an absolute physical culture. And towards such a life the empirical paucity of continence is not conducive, even though in remarkably strong characters it may at times energize itself into highly cultural expressions. But the rare personality is not a practical social criterion. The duty of society is not to thwart and warp the healthy sexuality of its members, but to direct it carefully to personal and social advantage. However, the total socialization of our sex life is necessarily utopian, because no sphere of human interest is quite as intimately selfish and touchily secretive. This native polarity between our strongest individual passion and its ideal civilization forms the plot around which the tragedy of the Eternal Magdalene centres.

The satisfaction of normal sex desire may be obtained in three ways: in marriage, which here we must interpret very loosely as any form of conventionalized sex behaviour designed to insure the family; in free love; and in common prostitution. The very exercise of true free love is implicitly a declaration on the part of those who enjoy it that a socially benevolent recognition of their relation is not necessary to the acquiescence of their conscience. They are inclined to view their attitude in the light of a moral and social emancipation from the bonds of matrimony. Though most of us may and do disagree with the ethics of those who genuinely believe in free love, it is absurd to consider it immoral, for its motivation is biased by a moral challenge. On the other hand, ordinary prostitution by its stealthy and self-opprobrious character implies the higher ethical and social value of marriage and hence is conscious of social disease. It relates itself to the institution of

marriage much as crime and felony stand to the legal code. So that as an institution the social evil is very closely related to marriage. It is either adulterously committed within its gates or it is due to the economic and personal difficulties of extending marital sovereignty to all cases of normal sexual indulgence. Schurtz points out that prostitution usually arises wherever early marriage is impossible and extra-conjugal intercourse is viewed as socially opprobrious.

The marital sentiment it is safe to regard with Ellis and other authorities as biologically conditioned to favour the family system. But the social, especially the legal, sanction of marriage began rather late in society as a socio-psychic complex in which the bargaining motive was the uppermost. The father of the tribe sold the girl to the best bidder. This character of the bargain, with its contractual correlation, is so conspicuous in the matrimonial motive that even the most civilized community emphasizes the "partnership" pattern for the happy marriage, which brings out quite clearly the notion of a utilitarian compact. The mere fact that many married couples love one another very dearly is not, of course, due to their riveted relationship but to mutual esteem and affection which they could indulge emotionally with equal ease in free love. Obviously, then, like any other bargain, matrimonial deals may prove unfortunate, and thereby contribute heavily to prostitutional behaviour in which the unhappily married often seek a narcotic from mutual persecution.

But marriage need not necessarily be unhappy for those tragic and melancholy factors to assert themselves which seek relief in the social evil. Ellis points out, it seems to me with insufficient emphasis, the connection between the ecstasy, in which libidinousness and the religious impulse are probably very closely interwoven, and the restraints of the conventional moralities. *Mores*, customs and morals, legal and fictitious, get too strained in the dullness of daily routine to permit of the entire dispensation of occasional cathartic intermissions of one kind or another. Bertrand Russell illuminatingly stresses the relation between the stupid and monotonous life of the petty citizen and his enormously swollen patriotism in war time when the normal love of country gives way to an orgiastic frenzy in which the usual pacific inhibitions are gregariously suspended. All of us, almost without exception, have spells of sexual neurosis, and though some of us may through character and training control their outburst or permit them the mild laxative of an innocent flirtation or the attenuated sublimation of the dance, the novel, the drama or the company of cultured and clever members of the other sex, most persons are cyclically subject to a more licentious ecstasy. There is little doubt that many men

pay an occasional visit to the brothel partly to enjoy its " glorious vulgarity." The amatory life of the average married man of the middle and the lower classes is often of such an undisturbed and even satiety that he soon learns to regard it as a periodic detumescence of his sexual vitality whose mechanical and loveless regularity stimulates tremendously his appetite for change, and directs his eros to the prostitute, who in such moments symbolizes a peculiarly fascinating complex of mysterious adventure and elemental obscene abandonment. This craving for complete sex revelry may frequently also enter the motivation of the single patron of the prostitute, but of course a large number of these are actuated by normal sex desire.

The irksome grind and lack of venture in the lives of the masses frequently injects a thirst for libidinous excitement into their recreational habits, which in the wholesome and rounded life express themselves in responsible plays and pleasures and in the cultural pursuits not incident to daily work. But the mind stupified by inanition or mechanical detail and the body poisonously fatigued by brutalizing exertion craves the stimulation of rapturous enjoyment. The " tired business man " in wholehearted appreciation of a questionable syncopated comedy is a mild case in point. Those who are familiar with the segregated district are well aware of the fact that many men make the rounds of the houses of ill-fame for purposes of diversion and vicarious sex excitement with no intention of actual indulgence, to which temptation, however, they almost invariably surrender.

This recreational desire is also a strong accessory factor in the inducement of the adolescent girl to enter upon the path which ultimately leads to prostitution. But in most cases of seduction the strongest set of predispositions which plays into the hands of the pimp and pander is the romantic complex, a compound sublimation of sexual ardour, exaggerated sentimentality and a utopian social and economic hopefulness centred around the person of the hypostatized or actual lover. This type of puberal fever renders the patient a very easy victim, because she is unconscious of her prostitutional summation, which is usually hastened by a weak mental and moral endowment showing itself in a native incapacity and dislike for concentrated work, an abnormal love of silly finery and the naïve imitativeness of the supposititious manners of high society.

These are only some of the most striking psychic factors which motivate the sexual business. But obviously there are as many predispositional factors to this traffic as there are individual psychoses among those who engage in it. The mental, moral and nervous traits of its practitioners and habitués enter into prosti-

tution quite as often and profoundly as they do into any other social problem.

On the other hand, recent study has absolutely discredited the conclusions of Lombroso, Ferrero, Dugdale and others that prostitution is a congenital moral idiocy accompanied by psycho-physical abnormalities. At best this is an *a posteriori* argument. Even though with a sufficiently fertile scientific imagination it may be establishable that many prostitutes show certain psychic and physical idiosyncrasies in common, this merely indicates that professional prostitution, exercised long enough, determines certain peculiarities in the individual prostitute which help to typify her. The same may be said with much more truth of the intellectual vocations. The striking similarity of the habits and even of the mental and psychognomic traits of university teachers the world over is an excellent illustration that the social type has a tendency to fluctuate with occupation. Yet one would hardly be justified in assuming that the academic career is congenitally conditioned. It may be relevant to remark here that in the literature of all social science it is scientifically important to weigh not only the factors which enter into the problem under consideration but also those which enter into the mental complex of the students, because scholarship has predilections of its own, the strongest of which is the love of fanciful abstraction and classification. And the biological interpretation of vice and crime is especially apt to appeal to the academic mind because it seems to give body to interesting phantasies.

But scholarship suffers still more from an unconscious partiality for the *status quo* which is due to its intrinsic need for an abnormally sheltered social and economic security, without which its very existence is endangered and which accounts for its historical temptation to succumb to the patronage of those individuals and institutions whom it considers the mandatories of the arts and sciences. It is common knowledge that those in power can by many other methods than gross purchase sponsor an erudite justification for their entrenchment. It is for these psychological reasons that the students of prostitution in capitalist society frequently obscure the logical intimacy between proletarian origin and prostitutional addiction by over-emphasizing the individual traits of the prostitute and her visitors at the expense of the economic factor. They argue that the lower classes also furnish the most numerous victims of other vicious, criminal and demoralizing habits, all of which in turn undermine their sexual morality. With equal intelligence poverty could be eliminated as the strongest factor in starvation on the ground that strictly speaking any problem in nutrition belongs to the realm of dietetics.

Five years of intimate contact with the problems of poverty and prostitution in charity organization and probation work have increasingly convinced me that over one-third of modern prostitution in its narrower sense is directly due to economic necessity, and that at least an equal number is traceable to causes of economic derivation. So, for instance, the housing conditions, not only of the very poor but even of the moderately poor, practically eliminate all opportunity for privacy, and hence for decency. The child witnesses matrimonial intimacies whose erotic appeals are almost certain to corrode its normal modesty. Many other instances of the close relation between economic abasement and sexual laxity might be quoted. In the slum districts of our cities the instincts of self-surrender and self-assertion, the desire for play and for recreation, the romantic complex, in fact the entire growing human personality of the adolescent girl in seeking pleasurable self-expression is groping in an atmosphere portentous with moral dangers. It is false to presuppose that the mental and moral traits of the potential prostitute are usually only slightly modified and hastened by economic degradation in the process of seduction. On the contrary, more frequently personal predispositions are merely the modificatory factors in the logical summation from dire need to occupational sexuality. The mentally under-endowed and morally weak or delinquent girl who is reared in an environment of debasing poverty is clearly more tempted to sell her most obvious commodity than the girl of equally defective nature who is protected by prosperity. Roughly, in the long run, the economic difference between these two girls furnishes the bulk of common prostitution.

The fight against poverty then recommends itself as the most potent and effective strategy against prostitution, if for no other reason than that all social hygiene must remain hypocritically self-defeating unless it presuppose the decency minimum of economic welfare. Economic indigence is naturally hostile to all spiritual growth, and it is in every way idle to preach the higher ethics to those to whom forces beyond their control deny the just rights of human dignity and self-respect.

BENJAMIN STOLBERG.

GEOGRAPHY AND CIVICS.

Some notes of a private discussion on the relation of Geography and Civics, recently held at Leplay House, may be of interest to readers of the *Sociological Review*. Below are printed :—

- (1) The statement circulated beforehand to those taking part in the discussion.
- (2) A note of the points developed in the course of the discussion itself.

I. Statement.

1. Let us assume that people are agreed as to the meaning of Geography now-a-days. The relation of Geography to Civics will depend upon the meaning given to Civics.
2. In the past Civics has tended to be largely or entirely political. Its connection with Geography (so far as recognised) has therefore lain in the study of political boundaries, frontiers, local government areas, strategic geography and the territorial limits of "racial" or "national" groups. The study of capital cities, fortified cities, naval dockyards, and coaling stations, and so on, has also had its place.
3. Civics is now acquiring a different meaning: take as examples the British Association Syllabus of Training for Citizenship, and the definition used by the Civic Education League, "Civics is the art of community life."
4. As an art Civics (like all other arts), must obviously be learned by practice. This practice must be based on clear (scientific) thinking and inspired by pure feeling. The question for discussion is therefore, how far geographical teaching can assist the development of the thought and feeling on which the Art of Community life is based.
5. Physical Geography as a study of natural surroundings (for the moment apart from their influences on human communities) can help materially toward forming the background of knowledge and love of the countryside which is inseparable from the spirit of community service. To do so, the scientific view of nature must never be regarded as separate from the æsthetic view.
6. Further, the study of natural surroundings (climate, surface relief, plant and animal life, etc.), exhibits the conditions under which the life of a community has developed in the past and must develop in the future. These conditions exert their influence by determining the occupations on which community life must be based. The study of occupation from this point of view is Economic Geography.
7. Under whatever natural conditions it exists, the community gives a shape or plan to its settlement and surroundings which exhibits certain fundamental tendencies of community life (*e.g.*, hut or house as place of separate family life: place for religious ceremony, etc.). The study of these plans of communities might be called Social Geography, though this term seems to be used to cover Economic Geography also.
8. Just as in studying Physical Geography some knowledge of the laws of physics, the processes of rock formation, the theory of planetary circulation, and so on, is required in order to explain obvious natural features and occurrences, so in studying Economic Geography some knowledge of Economic theory is required in order to explain the obvious economic organization and processes,

e.g., if there exists an economic law of marginal utility, there must be observable margins of cultivation, etc., which exhibit its operation.

9. The foregoing reasoning applies to what has been above termed Social Geography. To understand the lay-out of a human settlement, the plan of a city, the map of a land system, the plan of a building, we must know the social tendencies which find expression in the lives of the communities concerned. The study, classification and interpretation of these tendencies is sociology. Social Geography is not fully intelligible without a knowledge of sociology.
10. If all the social tendencies, which, working within the conditions imposed by the physical environment, and the occupations arising from these, give the community its form, can be exhibited in a systematic scheme, it is plain that this scheme will be of fundamental importance in the understanding of community life, and therefore in Civics. Sociologists maintain that they have such systematic schemes, or at least tentative efforts towards them.
11. It seems therefore worth discussing whether geographers and those interested in Civics cannot find means of co-operating systematically on the common ground between Sociology and Geography indicated above. Among the first questions to be settled, if such co-operation is to take place, are the following:
 - (a) Can a simple classification of fundamental social tendencies (suitable for text-book use) be agreed upon?
 - (b) Similarly, can a simple classification of the various historic expressions of these tendencies be laid down?

II. Note on Discussion.

1. It was stated, from the geographical side, that geographers would look with serious misgivings at much contained in such syllabuses as that compiled by the British Association Committee. Geographers have been educated to a world-view of people and affairs, and such documents do not embody a world-view.
2. It was maintained that it is for the sociologists to show the way in the study of social geography. Geographers would be willing to learn from them, and to correlate anything the sociologist had to say with other geographical knowledge. But geographers could not be expected to do the work themselves.
3. There were numerous suggestions with regard to the influence of the primitive occupational types on modern society. It was agreed on both sides that sufficient account is not taken of these types, their geographical distribution, and their developments at the present day. Suggestions were made as to how study of such matters could be promoted (by the preparation of bibliographies, etc.), and these were generally agreed to.
4. The point was made that the psychology of race is now passing beyond mere assumption into the region of ascertained fact, and that all civics students should give attention to recent work on this subject and to the light thrown by it on community life and history.
5. It was pointed out that there is at present no agreement among psychologists as to classification of fundamental social tendencies, and therefore not much probability of help from them on the lines suggested in the memorandum.
6. In reply to several of the above points, it was suggested that there are fundamental social tendencies which appear, under varying forms, in all communities, whatever the occupation and race-type of their members. These fundamental tendencies are at the root of the moral life, which has often been presented as a harmony or co-ordination of them. Their study and classification is, therefore, the important thing from the civics point of view, and their geographical expression is the subject-matter common to geography and civics.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY.

The first meeting of the Lent Term was held on January 25th, when Mr. H. J. Laaki delivered a lecture on "The Prospects of Parliamentary Government." Professor Graham Wallas in the chair. Mr. Laaki said that Parliamentary Government in this country had been subject to criticism for a long period. It might seem that serious criticism was a post-war development; on the contrary, however, there were vigorous discussions in the seventies of last century on the defects of parliamentary procedure. The difference at the present day lay in the rapid development of a widespread distrust of the whole parliamentary system, whereas in the seventies the criticism reflected a general belief in the system and desire to improve it. There was a definite decline in the influence of the House of Commons since its great period, between 1832 and 1870. The attention of the people was no longer concentrated on its proceedings, as it was forty or fifty years ago. At that time the fate of Ministers was decided there: now it was decided within the purlieus of Downing Street, whose barriers few people are permitted to pass.

This change Mr. Laaki attributed to various causes. Among these was the growth of the power of the Executive, many questions nowadays being argued, and even decided privately, between ministers or civil servants, and representatives of traders or workers. A deeper cause was the change in the character of the questions to which Parliament had to devote attention after 1870. Economic problems had come to the front, and now were more important than political questions in the older sense. The House had not sufficient time to deal effectively with work of this sort, nor were members well equipped, as a rule, for the task. Members of Parliament were drawn from a comparatively small section of society and the qualifications which gave them their seats were not usually the results of training and service in the local area which they represented in Parliament. Such training in local government would be of great value to members in enabling them to understand and represent effectively the interests for which they stood.

The disadvantages of the present system of Committees in the House were great. Members were chosen to sit on Committees without reference to their qualifications for the work. There was a whole range of questions, now dealt with by Committees of the House, which could be much more effectively treated outside it, as, for instance, industrial questions. These should come under the consideration of such a body as the National Industrial Council set up by the Government not long ago. It was obvious that in a Parliament, on a nominally geographical basis, but in which occupational interests really preponderated, industrial problems would meet with a somewhat one-sided treatment, owing to the small proportion of labour and independent representatives.

To reassure the working classes of the honesty and value of parliamentary government some "beau geste" was necessary, *e.g.*, the Nationalisation of the Mines.

Mr. Laaki said, in conclusion, that he could see no better method of government for Great Britain than by the party system, which was so closely allied to the spirit of our race.

Mr. Gooch and Mr. Finch spoke in the discussion which followed the reading of the paper.

On March 1st, Mr. Christopher Dawson's paper, "Sociology and Progress" (which is printed in this number of the *Review*), was read by the Secretary, Mrs. Fraser Davies, in the unavoidable absence of Mr. Dawson; Mr. Farquharson in the chair.

On March 15th, Mr. Leon Simon read a paper before the Society on "The Hebrew University in Jerusalem." A further notice of this paper will appear in the July issue of the *Review*.

In addition to the General meetings, the three Research Groups of the Society (for the study of *La Science Sociale*, Rural Development, and Social Psychology), have held fortnightly meetings.

La Science Sociale group, formed for the study of the Leplay school of Sociology, is engaged upon the work of Mons. Demolins, *Comment la route crée le type sociale*—and is preparing a translation in collaboration with the son of the author. In view of more recent research into early (*e.g.*, pre-Hellenic) civilizations, it is proposed, with due permission, to edit this translation by incorporating the results of such investigations. For this purpose Professor Fleure has addressed the group on two occasions already, showing, in particular, how our knowledge of the Barbarian invasions and their routes has advanced through research on the subject of the clearing of the forests. Dr. Desch, of Sheffield University, has also been present at some of the Group meetings.

At the ordinary meetings, the Group studies and discusses the subject matter of the book, gaining much from the personal comments and elucidations of the younger Mons. Demolins, who never fails to be present at the meetings.

The Rural Development Group has organised two meetings open to non-members of the Group, at one of which (on Friday, February 11), Captain Manclark Hollis, of the Village Centres Association, spoke of the services rendered to the community by the Enham Village Centre. Its work is the re-education of disabled ex-service men by enabling them to start life again as the result of a combined system of curative treatment and industrial training. The lecture was illustrated by lantern slides.

On March 11th, an address was given to the Group by Mr. Harold Lacey, of the Village Clubs Association, on "The Function of Village Clubs in Rural Areas." Mrs. Nugent Harris (National Federation of Women's Institutes) was in the chair.

At a meeting of the Social Psychology Group, on February 24th, Mr. Swinny gave an address on "The Sociological Schools of Comte and Leplay," which is printed in this number of the *Review*.

On March 7th, Mr. F. J. Gould spoke on "The Moral Dynamic implied in Comte's view of Education as first of the Arts"; and on March 21st, Mr. Morris Ginsberg read a paper on "The Theory of the Social or Group Mind."

Besides these activities the Secretaries of the Sociological Society and of the Civic Education League have held three very successful joint At Homes, at which addresses were given on Modern Movements in Drama, Literature and Painting. At the first At Home (Modern Movements in Drama) Alderman A. E. Davies and Mr. Norman MacDermott spoke on the Hampstead Everyman Theatre; at the second, Mr. Thomas Moulton discussed Modern Movements in Literature in an able and closely-reasoned paper; and at the third Mr. Wellington (Lecturer at the National Gallery) delivered a brilliant address on Modern Movements in Painting, with lantern illustrations.

MR. ENOCK'S PAPER.

Sir,

To the Editor, "Sociological Review."

I regret to see that my Paper read before the Society in November last, as published in the *Review*, has been considerably edited, and changed in certain respects. One of the principal points which I was concerned to make was that a true science of life must have a spiritual basis. This opening argument, which ran as follows, has been omitted, with subsequent passages, and interpolations have been made which are not mine, as well as a final sentence—all of which tends to give the Paper a materialistic tinge which is the very reverse of what I really conveyed. This was the opening:—

"The purpose of this Paper is, first, to enquire whether it is not now within our power to determine the principles of a settled and worthier state of society on the globe, such as we believe to be attainable; and, second, to endeavour to show that if such principles are definitely to be sought it must be in the field of a more advanced intelligence than we at present possess: an intelligence which, partaking in both the social and what has hitherto been segregated as the spiritual would transcend our present conceptions of both—a master-science of life, such as might well emerge from the present world-climax."

I then refer to the "spirit" and the "machinery" of the social life-process; to the "immutable principles prepared for man in nature, linking humanity indissolubly with the Cosmos"; and invite attention to the "Gospel of Structure" (which term also appeared in the title); and say, "'Structure' came to being 'in the beginning' when the earth was 'without form, and void,' when under the Creative Mandate nebulosity took on form." Then I said: "The structural law ordained at the beginning, not having been realised by mankind, was re-enunciated by the Founder of Christianity in the Golden Rule"; but your version makes me refer "to the ethical end of the problem"—words not mine. I also gave the structural sequence of "Cosmos, Logos, Ethnos," with the Alternative of Chaos, and conclude with, "The process is indeed more than scientific: it is super-scientific, reaching into the Supreme Laws, without which we shall labour in vain to build a durable social fabric." Your version makes me conclude with, "Surely the inference is that man should live according to the natural laws of his human home"—which is much less than I conveyed, especially in conjunction with the omissions above quoted. With regard to the title, the words "Regional" and "Rational" have both been interpolated. I avoided them because the first is being (in my mind) much over-used by sociologists (and is perhaps in danger of taking rank with "that blessed word Mesopotamia"), and the second is often misunderstood. I shall be greatly obliged if you will publish these corrections in the forthcoming issue of the *Review*.

Turning to another matter; I note, in the article preceding the Paper, an analogy concerning what the writer has termed my "general formula" of the social process of "Place," "function," and "behaviour," with that of Leplay's of "Place, Work, Family." This is interesting, but the latter would appear to be purely a social formula, whilst I am concerned to show that the true principles of life are cosmic. The "family," moreover, is a purely social and not an economic unit. Again, in this article, the writer insists on referring me back to "nature"—to which indeed I do go, but not as a beginning. These matters are of vast importance, for, in them, sociology will either attract or repel that large bulk of humanity which is influenced by things beyond Nature.

I am, Sir, Yours truly,

C. R. ENOCK, F.R.G.S.

Froxfield, Hants,

REVIEWS.

WHAT IS A GROUP?

THE NEW STATE. By M. P. Follett. New impression. London: Longmans, Green & Co., Paternoster Row.

"We find the true man only through group organisations." Miss Follett, quite unsuspected by herself, is here reiterating a central sociological principle, but, unlike the sociologist, she has not yet discovered the nature of this group organisation. Two generations and more have passed since Comte enunciated the principle that in all groups that accomplish work in the world, i.e., that attain to any full vision of life and approximately realize it, there are four elements, and proved this analysis by reference to history. Although attempts have been made since to develop a sociology without reference to Comte's principles, they have had poor success, and at the present time not only does at least one school of sociology acknowledge their force, but one or other of them is constantly being rediscovered as it were by a sidewind.

The four elements in a complete or functional human group are:—

- (1) People or operative element.
- (2) Leaders or organisers, the directive element (Comte's 'chiefs').
- (3) Intellectuals or intuitionals.
- (4) Expressionals or popularisers (Comte's 'emotionals'). (The expression being in art, writing, speech or deed.)

The two former constitute the 'Temporal Power' in any society or group, the two latter the 'Spiritual Power.'

The main reason for the *cul-de-sac* into which modern European civilization (not excluding these islands) is falling is the break up of the 'Spiritual Power,' and hence the weakness of its scattered elements which fail to hold the balance with reference to the 'Temporal Power.' Hence "étatisme," and all its attendant evils.

We find 'practical politics' carried on by the 'chiefs' with more or less consent from the people, while intuitionals either remain aloof or, with the popularisers, choose between selling themselves to the chiefs or spending themselves more or less vainly for the people.

This view of the complex nature of the group is, though not expressed, yet implicit, in Miss Follett's introduction. 'Democracy,' we are told, 'is the bringing forth of a genuine collective will, one to which every single being must contribute the whole of his complex life. But clearly this can only be if the intuitionals, the expressionals, and the leader are utilised to the full and in relation to each other as well as to the people, since these types of men all exist whether allowed to function freely or not. 'The technique of democracy,' she continues 'is group organisation.' But if this be so we need to consider the essential structure of groups and not merely their relation to the state.

This latter point is dealt with at considerable length in Part III, and the federative state is urged as the ideal type with much force. It is not intended in the least to attack the point of view taken, quite the contrary, but merely to suggest that while writers in other branches of scientific thought make use of past advances in knowledge, it is an unfortunate habit with many writers on society to assume that they can afford to disregard vital elements in the past history of their own subject and begin each book, as it were, *de novo*. This merely leaves the ground open to inherited presuppositions of their milieu so that they take these,

and not the reasoned conclusions of the central tradition in sociology, as their starting point.

Miss Follett appears to ignore the Leplay school of sociology no less than that of Comte, yet she adopts not only the group, but the 'small local group,' as the basis of a vital community, and as we pass on to the first book, "The Group Principle," we find, in an abstract form, a remarkable reaffirmation of the Leplay position, and of the Social Psychology based on it, as expressed, for example, in "The Making of the Future"¹ series of books. "Social Psychology must concern itself primarily with the interaction of minds. Early psychology was based on the study of the individual; early sociology was based on the study of society. But there is no such thing as the 'individual,' there is no such thing as 'society,' there is only the group and the group unit—the social individual. Social psychology must begin with an intensive 'study of the group'"—in short, it is a matter of Place, Work, Folk, and their action, and reaction, on each other!

In going on to explain, as she does at some length, the meaning she attaches to the group, which Miss Follett is taking, as we have seen, as the local group organized to serve as a basis of the state, she appears to fall into some confusion of ideas between such a group organized for action and a group of thinkers existing to think out problems or policy; a confusion natural to one who has not realised that the group in action must be of the fourfold nature mentioned above. She well describes on p. 86 the character of such a group of thinkers, i.e., of intuitionals and expressionals, but seems to be under the impression that her description covers all groups. It is a fair assumption that she is generalising from her experience of the intellectual group of friends in Boston, from which this book has come, as she mentions in the introduction.

But the conclusions of intuitionals and expressionals have to be adopted by organisers and carried through with some substantial body of the people before we can see a complete group in action. The group, as presented by her, tends to be too much a mere reversal of the present system under which the 'practical man' or organiser attempts to carry on without the inspiration of the intuitionals or with a merely subject fraction of the 'spiritual power' occupying itself in supporting the 'temporal.'

At the present time any group is commonly thought of as merely leaders and people, while Miss Follett's account of the group seems to stress unduly the intellectual and expressional element. This problem of the nature of the effective group is not one to be slurred over since it is of great practical importance, at least to those who hold with Miss Follett that it is to group organisation that our society must look for rescue.

It is the problem which the "Civic Association" in any place has to solve if it is to do its work. When you have in some degree united the intellectuals in any place (a difficult task in these days) and fired the expressionals, it is essential to get with you the leaders to organise the policy and the people to put their energy into its support. Curiously enough, it is the latter which is perhaps the most difficult of all, or perhaps, naturally enough, when we remember that the whole weight of industrialism (with the conditions it has involved) presses upon the people so that their natural development is suppressed and repressed.

It should be noted that the distinction between a group of the spiritual power and a crowd is well put by Miss Follett, and also that between the crowd and the mob, and again these and the herd. Miss Follett has indeed so keen and logical a mind that one hopes much that further study may bring her to the more concrete

1. "The Making of the Future" Series (Williams and Norgate), see especially "The Coming Polity" (2nd Ed.).

position advocated, and yet further away from the abstract and 'political' traditions in which we have all been nurtured.

In the chapter against the view that 'Democracy' is the rule of the majority we find an example both of these traditions in the assumption that 'Democracy' means the ideal, and also, in the endeavour to make it mean something other than majority rule an example of an acute mind seeking but not yet quite finding the necessary rôle of the 'spiritual power' (intuitionals and expressionals together) as informing and energising the 'temporal power' (leaders and people) in any group that functions normally.

So again in "The True Democracy" we find the statement that 'Democracy is the rule of an interacting interpermeating whole.' Yes, in true Democracy we should see in each generation organisers, intuitionals and expressionals arising from among the people, and working together in harmony with them.

This conception of the four elements in the group would be of great assistance to Miss Follett at many points, *e.g.*, without it, it is difficult to attach any particular meaning to the assertion she so frequently makes that the new psychology and the new conception of democracy involve that in some sense each man is to be the whole. But translate this, as she justly calls it, 'mystical' expression into the language of sociology, and we shall find that the full circuit of human life involves that each man in the course of his development shall be a member of the people, a leader, a thinker and a citizen, or expressional. These four categories are not separate and static, but, in so far as each individual can act in each capacity, just in so far as he is developing a complete human personality; while yet we must admit that in many, perhaps in most, cases he will tend to settle mainly into one or other division, and that in our modern world society represses and divides them all. Miss Follett is constantly feeling after this conception, as when she says: "My duty as a citizen is not exhausted by what I bring to the state; my test as a citizen is how fully the whole can be expressed in or through me."

The book, in short, is a noteworthy example of the trend of modern thought away from the old political philosophy or abstract study of 'society,' and a useful half-way house towards a more concrete sociology which studies actual societies in an expanding series from home and neighbourhood through region and city outwards to civilisation and humanity.

SYBELLA BRANFORD.

PROBLEMS OF A NEW WORLD. By J. A. Hobson. London: George Allen and Unwin.

This book has all the clarity, courage and obstinate insistence on the way of reason to which we are accustomed in Mr. Hobson's work. The still-persisting madness of war has not bullied him into altering his attitude. But it has stimulated him to an analysis, at once scientific and ironic, of the war-mind. "Scientific" we said; but it is not altogether easy to say what is scientific, in the region of the new psychology. Professor Watson, for instance, would seem to deny that there is any knowledge possible, except of the external movements of creatures in response to stimuli. He appears to doubt whether there is such a thing as an inner life. Perhaps he is not aware of one in himself, though that seems an extravagant conjecture. Apart, however, from these extremists, it is not easy to say what is scientific method in psychology. And the question is becoming every day more important for students of politics, since they are being more and more driven back upon psychology. Mr. Hobson's method, and the usual method among students of social science, is to observe actions and words, and infer states of mind. The inference, of course, is a hazardous operation, and it is usually performed by a kind

of introspection, the student examining, as well as he can, latent or active states in himself, and then projecting them into others. This is the method of literature and of ordinary life. Whether psychologists regard it as scientific I do not know; or, if they do not, what other they would substitute.

The point is important, because it is upon one's notions of how people feel and think that one's notions of what may be hoped from them depend. There is, for instance, at present a marked discouragement in most of the people called, either in admiration or contempt, 'idealists.' And they themselves are apt to be the first to proclaim that man will never be other than a beast. Mr. Hobson, on the contrary, argues that the impulses and motives commonly called 'ideal' are as much rooted in the physical facts and necessities of human life as the others, and have as good a right, and as good a prospect. Met with the question now so pertinent—why they succumb so abjectly in a time of crisis, he replies that it is not because they are imaginary, nor even because they are relatively weak, but because they are late in reacting and the others get in first. Briefly, men strike a blow before they reflect, and run into war before they consider consequences. If that be right, then it follows that the way to give the rational impulses their chance is to secure delay. That is the justification of all schemes of arbitration, and in particular of a League to postpone war (for it is thus, rather than as a League to prevent war, that Mr. Hobson conceives a league of nations). Experience would seem to bear out this view. What do the psychologists say about it? And how would they approach the question, if they wanted to establish its truth, or the reverse?

Turning now to the more strictly political contentions of the book, one point stands out. Mr. Hobson still believes in the possibility and necessity of fundamental social changes, such as those of which he has worked out a programme in many previous works. But in this book he concerns himself at length with the question of armed *versus* peaceful revolution. He is all against the former, briefly on the ground that possessing, governing, and technically intelligent classes are too strong to be rushed by a proletarian attack, and would be able successfully to meet either by force or by the boycott, any attempt to revolutionize society without their consent. Probably Mr. Hobson is right. He hopes, but, I think, rather forlornly, that enough of these privileged classes may be converted to the need of radical change to make it possible without violence. One can but hope with him, though the signs since the war have not been propitious, and the governing class everywhere appears to be as obstinate and unyielding as it has shown itself incompetent. But this question will not long remain in suspense and is anything but "academic."

C. LOWES DICKINSON.

INSTINCT AND THE UNCONSCIOUS. By W. H. R. Rivers, M.D., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S. Cambridge University Press. 16/- net.

Dr. Rivers publishes this contribution to a biological theory of the psycho-neuroses partly as the result of his own experiences in psycho-therapy during the war, partly as the result of his reflections upon certain experiments conducted by Dr. Head. In a book of great interest he puts forward a clear and well-reasoned thesis containing many valuable suggestions with regard to the proper definition of terms in psychological science. Such contributions as the present work of Dr. Rivers are extremely helpful in the matter of obtaining a system of standardized terms in psychology. It is inevitable that such a young science must pass through a difficult preliminary stage whilst some such widely accepted terminology is being devised. The question is at present a very important one for practitioners in psycho-therapy, who are striving to describe adequately the processes which they encounter in their

daily experience. The suggestions put forward by Dr. Rivers are helpful and reliable since they are based upon his wide experience and high attainments in medicine, physiology and anthropology. Psycho-analysis has suffered much from an unfortunate attempt at popularization which can be productive of little good and may be fertile in harm, at the present very tentative stage of our conclusions. Dr. Rivers, for instance, breaks away from the sexual preoccupations of Freud and Jung, and asserts that experience during the war has demonstrated fully that the danger-instincts can produce social disabilities as grave as those already associated with the sex instincts.

The condition of warfare which has recently convulsed Europe, however, is an abnormal state of society. Can the operation of these danger-instincts be traced in disorders arising in individuals engaged in the activities of the normal life of peace?—the keen struggle for existence and survival in modern business, for instance, or the grave anxieties and strains placed upon the poorer classes, living under the disastrous influences of trade slumps, with their corresponding periods of widespread unemployment? There seems to be here an opportunity for much investigation along lines indicated by experience gained during the war. The actual physical danger, of course, is not so pressing under conditions of social stress as it is on the battlefield, but there is acute conflict between social ideals with regard to the standard of conduct and living, and the economic limitations of behaviour in these directions, a conflict which probably produces considerable social disability in a large number of individuals. Does not this cause lie at the root of the more violent outbursts of feeling amongst the middle classes and the employers, the savage advocacy of reform by bomb and machine-gun amongst certain sections of the working classes? Is not the terror and despotism of the Bolshevik rule in Russia, as described by Mr. Bertrand Russell and Mrs. Philip Snowden, a fixed idea arising from the operation of the danger-instincts during the persecutions at the hands of the Czarist régime, suffered by the Bolshevik leaders before they came to power?

Dr. Rivers has developed in a most interesting way the results of the experiments in connection with protopathic and epicritic sensibility. Whilst remembering that much further work is needed along these lines, the results so far gained are full of suggestion in the study of the behaviour of groups and of individuals. They come as a valuable addition to the work of the older genetic psychologists and the studies of Dr. Trotter connected with the psychology of the group. The well-known capacity of the mob to swamp the individuality of its members and to sweep them away into a course of action of which they would be incapable as single units, has a striking resemblance to the all-or-none principle of the mass-reflex in physiological experiment, with its corresponding importance in the flight or immobility reactions of the whole herd. Moreover apart from the mere physical presence of a crowd, modern social life is full of publicity stimuli, deliberately designed, under the disguise of intelligent appeal, to play upon all the ancient tendencies, inherited from earlier phases of the history of the race, to mass-reaction within the herd. Struggling against these tendencies there is always the minority, endeavouring to exercise an epicritic capacity of judgment, to discriminate and to understand the confusion of social stimuli which is constantly assaulting them. Possibly, as regards social life, we are only at the beginning of the stage of epicritic sensibility, a sensibility which will be deepened and enriched by a more thorough understanding of psychological processes and a much wider diffusion of psychological knowledge amongst individuals with a corresponding increase in psychological control. Such progress in psychological explanation, however, can only be built up by sound and cautious investigation, of which work this book by Dr. Rivers is an excellent and most welcome example.

F. M. H. HOLMAN.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY. By William Brown; with a foreword by William Aldred Turner. London: Edward Arnold. pp. xi + 196. Price, 8/6.

The psycho-analytical principles laid down by Freud have met with an opposition which by its intensity recalls the reception given to the Darwinian theory. Despite this, we see in this country a number of workers who, approaching the subject by methods of personal investigation, reach varying degrees of acquiescence in Freudian doctrine. Setting off from individual standpoints, they present valuable material to those who, bewildered by denunciations of Freud and all his works on the one hand, and on the other by the wide-reaching nature of his conceptions, seek for means to form their own opinions. Such a worker is Dr. William Brown, and although the primary object of his *Psychology and Psychotherapy* is to discuss the psychological processes concerned in the causation and treatment of those mental disturbances commonly called 'functional nervous disorders,' yet this object necessitates a close examination of the theories of Freud; and at the present stage of controversy Dr. Brown does well to make clear his own position in regard to them.

In doing this he traces their growth from a belief in 'abreaction' to their present form in which the neuroses are explained in terms of the development of the psycho-sexual life of the child. His own position is that of a strong believer in abreaction by hypnosis, aided if necessary by more strictly psycho-analytical methods which lead him occasionally to the finding of what he calls 'Freudian cases' and to the conclusion that "... the facts upon which Freud bases his theory of psycho-analysis do admit of verification in certain types of patient. Whether his *Libido Theory* can hold its ground as a general theory true alike for normal and abnormal psychology is a question which has yet to be decided."

In the early chapters Janet's theory of dissociation is illustrated by cases of the writer's own and others recorded by Morton Prince, and is linked up to the more dynamic psycho-analytic conception. A critical survey of Freud's views of emotion ends with the remark that they are "not only vague and incomplete, but also suffer from a lack of historical relationship with the work of expert psychologists." Admirers of his originality would perhaps derive comfort from these conclusions.

Dr. Brown sets a very high standard for psycho-pathology when he writes, concerning Freud's theory of narcissism, "The factor of cure is—fundamental, not only from the patient's point of view, but theoretically. If one cures one's patients, it is to a certain extent confirmatory evidence of the truth of one's theory. In the absence of cure, doubt is justifiable."

Babinski's clear-cut theory of suggestion as the beginning and end of hysteria receives, and perhaps needs, little attention—whoever accepts the facts of emotional revival and its efficacy in removing symptoms must necessarily give up belief in the suggestion theory. The physical factors—infectious and such-like—which are still regarded as of importance by many people, are ignored. Perhaps in this the author is also right. Bodily disease in the neurotic should be treated just as in other people, but there is still a tendency to search for something to treat by physical means whilst the all-important mental causes are neglected. The necessity for the study of endocrine glands and their influence is not overlooked. It is here that we are likely to find the closest relation between physical and emotional factors in disease.

The unsatisfactory state of nomenclature is reflected in this book. Every writer is compelled to make his own classification, and if he is self-consistent the reader must be content. But although Dr. Brown refers in his earlier chapters to hysteria, neurasthenia, psychasthenia, compulsion neurosis and anxiety hysteria, yet

in his summary of treatment he uses only the first two terms, and uses *neurasthenia* very loosely indeed. As a matter of fact the word has now lost any definite significance, and if he had not attempted to define it earlier one could not question his use of it to indicate any neurosis which is not a conversion hysteria.

The neuroses of war provide the author with plenty of material to illustrate his methods of autognosis and abreaction and their successful results. He concludes with a review of the theories of relation between mind and brain, and a warning of the close connection between 'the occult' and mental disease. The importance of his own belief in telepathy seems to have escaped him. If there is a "power that one mind has of acting upon another otherwise than through the medium of the senses," we must be prepared to find psychological processes interfered with at any moment in ways which will defy control or explanation. Such possibilities are opened up that Dr. Brown should not be content to support his belief by the statement that "there is an enormous mass of evidence for telepathy," but should present his readers with the same opportunity of examining his own evidence that he has given in regard to the views of Freud, which are, considered as pure psychology, less revolutionary than would be the scientific proof of telepathy.

The book is a timely exposition of the results of personal investigation in a subject the importance of which is only beginning to be appreciated.

M. C.

CREDIT-POWER AND DEMOCRACY : With a Draft Scheme for the Mining Industry. By C. H. Douglas. With a Commentary on the included Scheme by A. R. Orage. London : Cecil Palmer, 1920. Pp. xi + 212. 7/6 net.

This book deserves the closest attention of professional economists and of those of the public who are willing to devote serious consideration to social problems of great magnitude. The book is not easy reading; the author has propounded a thesis it is believed to be substantially original, although in one part of it we are reminded of certain of Thorstein Veblen's theories. Running counter as it does to the prevalent economic practice and the theory concomitant therewith, the proposals of this volume would have received much more attention had the principles been worked out in fuller detail with ample concrete illustrations at each stage. It is true that the distinguished Editor of the *New Age* has added an able commentary on the illustrative "draft-scheme," to be applied to the coal-mining industry. But concrete illustrations on a much smaller scale are needed throughout a text, obscure and difficult from the very nature of the subject, if apparently compact and clear-cut in exposition.

The promulgator of new theories in the field selected by our author has the hard task of educating his public (including his critics). And when these theories, as in the present work, imply any principle that runs counter to accepted usage, the task is doubly difficult. To this end he must, as we think, be content to walk slowly hand-in-hand with his readers, continuously pointing out simple illustrations of the significance and also the limitations of the principles of his new system as the journey proceeds.

We hope this striking work will pass into a second edition, and that the author, who has clearly devoted such careful thought to his thesis, will meantime be seizing the opportunity for amplifying and enriching his exposition. He will thus himself, also, as we believe, in all probability reap the advantage of further testing his system and discovering the sharper limitations of his principles. And in this connection we would remind him of the similar procedure of a great fore-runner who made so profound an impression on his own times—Adam Smith, who obtained

his illustrations, tested his principles, so far as could be done without whole-sale application, and simultaneously discovered his own limitations, by years-long and deliberate intercourse and community with the widest variety of business men and thinkers here and abroad.

Perhaps we may justly select the following co-related passages as embodying one of the cardinal principles of the thesis:—

"It will be observed that there is no conflict of opinion between the producer-control and the consumer-control ideas of credit issue as to the fact that an enormously increased use of credit facilities is the only radical solution of the present difficulties; and . . . it is just as feasible to issue this credit to the consumer by selling "below cost" as it is to issue it to the producer by anticipating payment. In both cases it is public credit which is used, but, in the first place, the credit is issued with the goods instead of in advance of unspecified production" (p. 143). . . . "Consumer-control (is) the only way to free produce-initiative" (p. 134).

The reader must be referred to the careful study of the book itself for the author's courageous attempt to establish and apply the above and co-related principles of his proposed policy. Considerations of space and time, and the possibility that we have not fully grasped the kernel of the author's thesis all alike forbid any detailed critique of the policy and principles advocated.

It is enough to say that we are not convinced of the soundness of the economic analysis put forward; but we are convinced that the author and his commentator have done no mean service to the community in the courage and tenacity with which they have directed attention to the increasing need of a juster control and distribution of credit to a harassed world; and that whether we concur or do not concur in the principles of the book, and to whatever degree, the present work will be found a serious challenge to accepted doctrine, and a valuable stimulus to thinking. For these reasons we wish it a speedy second edition.

X.

THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. By Dr. F. Müller-Lyer. Translated by E. C. and H. A. Lake. Pp. 362. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1920. Price, 18/- net.

Dr. Müller-Lyer's *Phasen der Kultur*, of which this book is a translation, is the first of a series of six volumes in which the author gives a comprehensive treatment of the whole course of man's social development. The title of this volume belongs rather to the work as a whole than to this first part, which deals primarily with the economic stages of culture. The first book (63 pp.), however, forms a general introduction to the whole series, dealing briefly with the nature of the science of culture and with the origin of the human race. At the end of the volume there is an even more general disquisition on the nature of Progress, the age and probable duration of the Earth, and the relation of Culture and Happiness. This is characteristic of the author's whole treatment of his subject, which tends to excessive generalization. Moreover, the ethnological and geographical aspects of culture are unduly neglected, and sometimes forcibly subordinated to the author's economic schematization. What real value can there be in a classification (p. 95), which places in a single economic-cultural group such diverse peoples as the Bedouin, the naked Dinka of the Nile swamps, and the Galla, of the well-watered Abyssinian highlands? A similar disregard of modern ethnology is shown by the author when he describes the peoples of the Mediterranean area as consisting

of three races—Semitic, Hamitic and Aryan; and the same passage contains a truly surprising reference to "the Assyro-Babylonians of Asia Minor."

However, the central thesis of the book is an economic one. Dr. Müller-Lyer divides the economic history of the world into three epochs: that of Clan Organization, which includes all primitive peoples; that of Industrial Organization, which includes the societies of early classical times and of Mediæval Europe, and that of Capitalistic Organization, which includes in its earlier stage, the highest development of the classical world, and Western Europe, from the 16th to the 18th centuries, and in its later stage the modern world only. Finally, he regards 1881 as marking the beginning of a new epoch—that of world economy and socialized industry.

The book contains a very full analysis of contents, but no index. The reference to authorities quoted in the text are insufficient, and contain numerous misprints. It requires, for instance, some effort of mind to realize that the reference at the foot of p. 186, Conrado Handu. u Staatw, is intended to refer to an unspecified volume and article in Conrad's *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*. The translation also is not free from mistakes, such as Metoken for metics, and "The Third Position" instead of "The Third Estate."

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

PSYCHOLOGY AND FOLKLORE. By R. R. Marrett. pp. 275. Methuen, 1920.

It is a great pleasure to review Dr. Marrett's latest volume. One is conscious of coming into contact with a mind which has imbibed the best of the Oxford tradition and is at the same time in touch with all the main tendencies of thought in the Anthropology and Sociology of to-day. The combination seems here, as perhaps always, to make for a remarkably humane, balanced and rational outlook on the problems dealt with.

Among those problems are that of the relation of Sociology and Psychology, the first essay being an admirable statement of the case for the use of both sociological and psychological method in social science.

Equally interesting is the suggestion of a link between the study of folklore both in its survivals and revivals, and a systematic view on the lines of the psychology of instinct, of the impulses from which folk-lore arises.

In another essay is put forward the remarkable thesis that the "mana" and "tabu" ideas show a definite tendency towards the recognition of the superiority of spiritual power, knowledge and self-control.

It would require a lengthy article merely to state the many suggestions besides those already mentioned put forth by the author in the course of this work; they touch the fields of history, science, religion, medicine and university education.

Throughout the book one feels that one is listening to the conversation of a student who has taken a unified outlook over the field of his science, has reflected on his results in the cloister of Oxford, and is unable to conceive of even the most abstruse subject as having any final justification except in relation to life.

A. FARQUHARSON.

ATHENA: A Year Book of the Learned World. Edited by C. A. Ealand, M.A. London: A. & C. Black Ltd., 1920. 15/- net.

This book is a valuable addition to the shelf where the scholar or student of the present day keeps the minor tools of his tasks. It purports to be, and is (within limits) a directory of the Academic Bodies of the English-speaking world;

the greater part of the space is given to the Universities and Colleges of an University standing; some learned societies are added. The selection of the latter seems unsatisfactory in result—indeed one cannot infer the principle on which it is done; but one knows the difficulty of collecting information about such bodies through the post. The Sociological Society has not secured a place amongst those noticed: no doubt this will be rectified in future editions. The type used, and the method of setting out the information seems open to criticism: the page has not quite a handy appearance: and some space appears to be wasted. One also questions whether the arrangement under cities (in spite of its traditional character) is indisputably the best. All these are minor defects, however: in the main the book is a valuable addition to the number of modern reference books published in English, and it is to be hoped that it will receive the support required to ensure its continuance and extension.

POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM LOCKE TO BENTHAM. By Harold J. Laski. (Home University Library of Modern Knowledge.) Pp. 323. Published by Messrs. Williams and Norgate, London, 1919. Price 3/6 net.

This little book is written in a remarkably clear, simple and orderly style, and seems in arrangement, proportion and emphasis, exactly what such a manual should be. The main influences and lines of thought are well-defined, and the relation of political thought to historical events is borne in mind throughout. A sociologist might desire more suggestions on the relation of political to scientific and religious thinking—but that would, perhaps, be asking the author to go outside the limits of his subject.

COMMUNITY: a Sociological Study. By R. M. MacIver. (2nd edition.) Macmillan 15/- net.

The first edition of this book was reviewed at length in the spring issue of the *Sociological Review*, in 1917 (Vol. IX, No. 2). The second edition embodies one or two minor alterations, but is substantially the same book as the first. It need hardly be said that the lapse of time since its first publication has in no way decreased its value; it remains one of the few text-books of sociology to which the student can be directed with confidence.

FORTHCOMING MEETINGS.

The following joint meetings of the Sociological Society and the Regional Association have been arranged :—

Friday, April 22nd, at 6 p.m.,

"The Saffron Walden Survey" (illustrated by lantern slides).

Mr. GEORGE MORRIS.

Thursday, May 12th, at 8.15 p.m.,

"Co-operation in Social Studies."

Professor PATRICK GEDDES.

Thursday, June 2nd, at 8.15 p.m.,

"The Municipal Survey of Sheffield."

Professor ABERROMBIE.

Note.—The first of these meetings will be in the rooms of the Linnean Society, Burlington House, W. The other two meetings will be held at Leplay House, 65, Belgrave Road, S.W. 1.

The Exhibition of Civic Surveys will be continued at Leplay House during the Summer Term

Group meetings of the Sociological Society :—

The next meeting of *La Science Sociale* Group will be held on Wednesday, April 13th, at 8.45 p.m. The Group will meet fortnightly during the Summer Term, unless otherwise intimated.

The next meeting of the Social Psychology Group will be held on April 18th, at 5.15 p.m., at which Miss Maud Bodkin will read a paper on "Psycho-Therapy in relation to Social Psychology."

Professor Geddes, being home from India, will give a course of 8 lectures on Civics at Leplay House in May, each Tuesday and Friday, at 8.15 p.m., to be followed by a course of 8 lectures on Sociology in June.

Fee for course of 8 lectures, 5/- (payable at first lecture).

" " single lectures 1/-

Further meetings of the Society will be announced later.

NOTES AND NEWS.

The following data are supplied to the *Economist* by a correspondent:—

In May 1919 there were about a million and a quarter unemployed, and now there are approximately the same number. In 1919 £58,000,000 was spent on relief of the unemployed, and over £1,000,000 a week is now being spent. Simultaneously other Departments of the Government are concerned in reproductive works. To the Forestry Commission set up in August 1919, a block grant of about £3,500,000 was granted for a ten year period to cover administration, land-purchase, planting, grants to land-owners, forestry education and research. At present about 1,000 men are being employed. It is proposed to plant up to 1,800,000 acres in 40 years. Under an accelerated scheme it would be possible to plant many more acres, or in all 10,000,000 acres within a period of 10, 30 or 60 years, according to the state of the labour market. Under this scheme about 125,000 could be employed, viz., 50,000 in planting, 25,000 in road-making, etc., 25,000 in betterment of adjacent land as by drainage, gorse and heather cutting, manuring, etc., 25,000 in building sawmills, houses, etc. In addition 360 trained forest officers, 600 foresters and 9,600 foremen would be needed. For this purpose there are five forestry schools. Under this accelerated scheme, expenditure might be taken at £7,000,000 per annum, including land-purchase. Now as to the financial results; timber now worth 1/- per cubic foot would in 70 years be worth 3/- if, as is said to be likely, the rate of rise of 3% in the price of timber observable over past few decades, is maintained. Allowing only a yield of 5,000 cubic feet per acre and a total afforested area of 10,000,000 acres, the value of the standing timber on this area at the end of 70 years would be £7,500,000.

An interesting educational experiment is being carried on in one of the smaller cities of U.S.A., namely, Johnstown, Pa. A study of the improvement-plan of the town was introduced in the schools as a part of the English course several months ago, and essays were written on the fundamental features of the plan. As a result a challenge was formally presented to the taxpayers and officials of the municipal government at the commencement exercises of the graduating class for 1920: "If you don't grasp the opportunity to improve Johnstown and give it the place it deserves among the cities of the country we will."

Six boys and girls, ranging in age between 12 and 15 years, discussed, with forcible argument, under topical heads, reasons why the report of the city-planning commission should be adopted. Each subject was illustrated with slides, the juvenile speakers explaining with precision and effect just what the improvements proposed would accomplish in beautifying Johnstown.

The statement of fact offered in support of their contentions showed a perfect understanding of the subject that only hard application to study could achieve. The following were the subjects discussed: "The Planning Commission and its jurisdiction"; "The Plan as a whole"; "Thoroughfares"; "Rivers and Bridges"; "Parks and Playgrounds"; "Municipal Buildings."

The principal point stressed by all the speakers was the great future of

Johnstown, and the duty of every citizen to prepare and work for the requirements that are already urgent. It was pointed out that while it was impossible to re-make the older portions of the city, the large areas in the outskirts held out inducements for great developments, with every opportunity for the application of modern ideas which make for comfort based on utilizing every favourable factor to the improvement of human efficiency. Advancement of American civic standards was reviewed, and the development of the "city beautiful" as being as important as the "city useful," and that more inspiring surroundings are conducive to better men and women, which, it was pointed out, inevitably results in a better community spirit. As an educational feature it was an original and wide departure from anything before attempted. It developed the best thought and study of the pupils, but it did more than this, it gave opportunity for presenting many ideas and suggestions along the line of civic development that may well be applied in practical service.

Mrs. Ormsby (née Rodwell-Jones) and Mr. Montgomerie send us a valuable six-inch map of the Walthamstow—Leyton district with contours derived from direct survey under her supervision. It should form a most useful basis for local studies and regional surveys, and its quality is as high as that of the work which has become typical for Mrs. Ormsby's department at the School of Economics. Contours are at five-foot intervals with thicker lines at 25 foot intervals. The sheet is without names in order to be more useful for mapping of data. A useful feature is a circle in the S.W. corner giving the exact directions in degrees from true north. The latitude and longitude are also inserted in detail. The map is published by Sifton Praed, Ltd., St. James' Street, S.W.1, and may be bought from that firm for educational purposes.

The *Western Daily Mail* gives an account of a meeting at Bristol to promote and organize a local Survey. The case was put to the meeting by Mr. C. E. Elcock, F.R.I.B.A., Secretary of the York Rotary Club. He said that the aim was to collect and show graphically all data bearing upon the evolution, present condition, and future development of the district or "Region." He pointed out the necessity of the work for developing a strong community sense, the co-ordination of individual interests in the interest of the community, the evils caused by the haphazard growth of towns. Diagnosis necessary before remedy, preparation for future developments, the value of carefully ascertained and tabulated diagrams, and facts for future civic and community use. He emphasized the need for seeing the co-operation of the University, Rotary Club, scientific, philosophical, and similar groups in collecting and tabulating the information obtained. Six main committees would be required to study, amongst other things, the physical condition (geographical, climatic, etc.); the historical condition (Early, Mediæval, and Modern); the existing social and economic condition; future development, etc. A large number of sub-committees would be required, and it was emphasized that in the collection of the facts, which might take from five to ten years to complete, the services of many varying groups might be utilized from the elementary and secondary school children to the adult. Such a survey, with its accompanying development of community and civic interest, was not an ideal or charitable object which we might or might not do as we liked, but was above all a piece of sound and real "business," the alternative of not doing it would be found in the continued haphazard and selfish development of the city and district, leading to these restrictions of the growth and freedom of the individual, which eventually resulted in a C3 population and a continual state of community "unrest." A committee was appointed towards initiating and carrying out the project.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

**PHILOSOPHIE DES SCIENCES SOCIALES*. By René Worms. III, *Conclusions des Sciences Sociales*. Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale. Second, revised edition. pp. 301. Marcel Giard and Co., Paris, 1920. 10 frs.

**INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LEGISLATION*. By H. J. W. Hetherington. pp. 194. Methuen and Co., London, 1920. 6/- net.

**PAPERS RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DYABHY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA*, to which are appended the Report of the Joint Select Committee and the Government of India Act, 1919, with an Introduction by L. Curtis. pp. 606. Clarendon Press, 1920. Oxford. 31/6d. net.

**REVOLUTION FROM 1789 TO 1906*. Documents selected and edited, with notes and Introduction, by R. W. Postgate. pp. 400. Grant Richards, London, 1920. 18/-.

**WARFARE IN THE HUMAN BODY*. Morley Roberts. With an Introduction by Professor Arthur Keith. pp. 286. Eveleigh Nash Company, London, 1920. 18/- net.

**THE I.W.W. : A Study of American Syndicalism*. By Paul Frederick Brissenden. Columbia University Studies in Political Science. Vol. LXXXIII; Whole Number, 193. Second Edition, pp. 438. Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1920. \$4.00

THE LABOR LAW IN MARYLAND. Malcolm Lauchheimer. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Series XXXVII. No. 2, pp. 166. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1919. \$1.25.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. Warren B. Hunting. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Series XXXVI, No. 4. pp. 122. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1919.

THE AMERICAN COLONIZATION SOCIETY, 1817-1840. E. Lee Fox. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Series XXXVII, No. 3, pp. 231. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1919. \$2.00.

**FRENCH PROTESTANTISM*. Caleb Guyer Kelly. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Series XXXVI, No. 4, pp. 185. John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1918.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS. By D. P. Smelser. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Series XXXVII, No. 1, pp. 154. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1919. \$1.25

**LABOUR AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM*. A series of Essays comprising a Short History of the International Labour Organisation and a Review of General Industrial Problems. By G. N. Barnes, A. Fontaine, Dr. Shotwell, Emile Vandervelde, Minoru Oka, Albert Thomas, W. A. Appleton, H. B. Butler, Sophy Sanger,

E. J. Solano. Edited by E. John Solano. With 5 Appendices. pp. 345. Macmillan, London, 1920. 18/- net.

***SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION.** John A. Ryan. pp. 242. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1920. 15/-.

JUNIOR WAGE EARNERS. A. Reed, assisted by Wilson Woelpper. pp. 171. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1920. 7/6d.

PURE THOUGHT AND THE RIDDLE OF THE UNIVERSE. By Francis Sedlak. Vol. I: Creation of Heaven and Earth. pp. 375. Allen and Unwin, 1921. 18/- net.

KARL MARX AND MODERN SOCIALISM. F. R. Salter. pp. 263. Macmillan and Co., London, 1921. 6/- net.

NATIONALISM. By G. P. Gooch. The Swarthmore International Handbooks. Edited by G. Lowes Dickinson. pp. 127. The Swarthmore Press Ltd., London, 1920. 2/6d.

CAUSES OF INTERNATIONAL WAR. G. Lowes Dickinson. The Swarthmore International Handbooks. Edited by G. Lowes Dickinson. pp. 108. Swarthmore Press, London, 1920. 2/6d. net.

UNIFYING THE WORLD. G. N. Clark. The Swarthmore International Handbooks. Edited by G. Lowes Dickinson. pp. 116. Swarthmore Press, London, 1920. 2/6d. net.

PATRIOTISM AND THE SUPER-STATE. J. L. Stocks. The Swarthmore International Handbooks. Edited by G. Lowes Dickinson. pp. 105. The Swarthmore Press, London, 1920. 2/6d. net.

* An asterisk indicates that a notice of the book will appear in the next or subsequent issues of the *Review*.

BOOK OF REFERENCE RECEIVED.

THE SUBJECT INDEX TO PERIODICALS, 1917—1919. B—E. Historical, Political and Economic Sciences, 1917—19. The Library Association. Pp. 495. (Agents P. S. King and Co.) London, 1921. 41. 1s. net.

PAMPHLETS RECEIVED.

THE CASE FOR FEDERAL DEVOLUTION. The Rt. Hon. J. A. Murray Macdonald. Reprinted from the *Times*. Pp. 69. P. S. King, London, 1920. 2/6d. net.

PIOUS PHRASES IN POLITICS. J. W. Jendwine. An Examination of some Popular Catchwords, their Misuse and Meaning. Pp. 85. P. S. King and Co., London, 1919. 2/- net.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSPORT IN THE PRODUCTION OF WEALTH. By William Drury, M.A. Pp. 23. Hodgson, London, 1921. 1/- net.

TRUTH ABOUT VENEREAL DISEASE. By Dr. Marie Stopes. Pp. 52. G. P. Putnam's Sons, London, 1921. 1/6d. net.

PERIODICALS RECEIVED.

ACTA ACADEMIAE ABOENSIS.
 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY.
 ANNALS OF AMERICAN ACADEMY.
 ECONOMICA.
 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL.
 THE GEOGRAPHICAL TEACHER.
 HINDUSTANI REVIEW.
 INDIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL.
 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
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